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Inefficient continuation decisions, job creation costs,
and the cost of business cycles
Wouter J. Den Haan
Centre for Macroeconomics and Department of Economics,
London School of Economics and Political Science, and CEPR
Petr Sedlacek
Department of Economics, University of Bonn
This paper develops a model according to which the costs of business cycles are
nontrivial because they reduce the average level of output. The reason is an inter-
action between job creation costs and an agency problem. The agency problem
triggers separations during economic downturns even though both the employer
and the worker would be better off if the job was not discontinued, that is, af-
fected jobs have strictly positive surplus values. Similarly, booms make it possible
for more jobs to overcome the agency problem. These effects do not offset each
other, because business cycles reduce the expected job duration for these jobs.
With positive job creation costs, business cycles then reduce the creation of valu-
able jobs and lower average activity levels. Considering a wide range of parameter
values, we find estimates for the cost of business cycles ranging from 203% to
127% of gross domestic product.
Keywords. Agency problem, welfare, permanent job loss.
JEL classification. E24, E32.
1. Introduction
This paper documents that even modest business cycles can be quite costly in a very
simple framework with risk neutral agents and the following four features. First, creat-
ing a job requires a fixed job creation cost. Second, there is job heterogeneity. In par-
ticular, jobs differ in their productivity level and creation cost. Third, the employer and
employee face an agency problem when deciding to continue an existing job and, simi-
larly, when deciding to start operating a newly created job. This leads to job separations
that are inefficient in the sense that the joint benefits for the employer and the employee
when the job is discontinued are lower than what would be earned if the job could con-
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tinue. Fourth, the agency problem is such that the number of inefficient job separations
increases during a recession.
In this paper, we generate the last two features using the contractual fragility frame-
work of Ramey and Watson (1997), in which participants cannot commit to putting in
high effort. But these two features are quite typical outcomes in business cycle mod-
els with an agency problem.1 The agency problem introduces an effort constraint into
the model: if total revenues are not high enough, then the effort constraint is not sat-
isfied. If there are enough resources available, then contracts can be written such that
it is optimal for both participants to stay in the existing relationship and to put in high
effort. If there are not enough resources available, then no such contracts can be written
even though joint revenues generated under high effort (net of the cost of effort) exceed
the joint revenues generated outside the relationship and also exceed the joint revenues
generated under low effort. Consequently, potential jobs with revenues that are too low
are not created and existing jobs for which revenues drop below the required level are
discontinued.
A job’s productivity level is affected by a stochastic aggregate variable and by a job-
specific variable. To study the impact of business cycles, we analyze the effect of intro-
ducing mean-preserving fluctuations in the aggregate productivity level. The four fea-
tures mentioned above do not provide a reason for business cycles to be costly when
considered separately. But the interaction between them does make business cycles
costly. In particular, we show that fluctuations are costly because they deter job creation
and lower the average level of output produced. The following paragraph describes why
this happens.
Some jobs that do not satisfy the effort constraint in a world without business cy-
cles could do so during a boom. Business cycles are beneficial for these jobs. There are
also jobs that always satisfy the effort constraint when there are no business cycles but
would no longer be able to do so during a recession. Business cycles are costly for these
jobs. The job destruction during a recession that is induced by the agency problem in-
creases the cost of recessions as in Caballero and Hammour (2005), but the job creation
during a boom that is made possible by a relaxation of the agency problem increases the
benefits of booms. If there are no job creation costs, then there is no robust reason why
the negative effects during a recession would significantly outweigh the positive effects
during a boom. With job creation costs, however, it is no longer true that the benefits of
extra jobs during a boom should roughly offset the losses of less jobs during a recession.
In a world without business cycles, all jobs in our model survive until they are hit by an
exogenous destruction shock. In contrast, in a world with business cycles the jobs that
only satisfy the effort constraint during a boom only last until the next recession. That
is, the agency problem is such that one cannot compensate for an inability to satisfy the
effort constraint during bad times with slack during good times. Consequently, business
cycles necessarily reduce the expected duration of affected jobs. This means that the
positive and the negative effects of business cycles do not offset each other, not even if
1In Appendix A.2 of Den Haan and Sedlacek (2009), we showed that the same type of result can be gen-
erated in a model in which there is an agency problem in obtaining firm finance.
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the output gains of the jobs temporarily made possible by the boom offset the output
losses of the jobs made temporarily impossible by the recession. There are two reasons.
First, jobs created during booms and eliminated during the subsequent downturn have
to pay job creation costs more often, since their expected job duration has gone down.
Second and more importantly, some jobs are no longer created, since it is too costly to
create them given that their expected duration has been shortened by business cycles.
These jobs may be marginal in terms of being able to satisfy the effort constraint of the
agency problem, but they have a strictly positive surplus from a social welfare point of
view. Consequently, their disappearance has nontrivial welfare consequences.
In terms of magnitude, business cycles are as bad as a permanent drop in output
of several percentage points. In contrast, the classic Lucas (1987) paper reports an esti-
mate for the cost of business cycles that is less than one-tenth of a percentage point of
consumption when the coefficient of risk aversion is equal to 10. Our model does not
rely on high risk aversion to explain why moderate fluctuations like business cycles are
costly. In fact, we assume that agents are risk neutral. As pointed out in Lucas (2003), if
agents are highly risk averse, then the question arises as to why high risk aversion does
not show up in, for example, the diversification of individual portfolios, the level of in-
surance deductibles, or the wage premiums of jobs with high earnings risk.
Our paper fits into a line of research that investigates the effect of uncertainty on the
level or growth rate of output, which Lucas (2003) referred to as “. . . a promising frontier
on which there is much to be done.”2 In addition to the assumption of linear utility, our
framework differs from related papers in that we focus on different model features to
generate the relationship between volatility and the level of real activity. Those are costly
job creation and an agency problem that affects the ability to make efficient decisions,
which are two features often found in business cycle models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our frame-
work. In Section 3, we discuss model properties. In particular, we discuss what types of
jobs are affected by business cycles and why. We also show that some jobs are affected
by arbitrarily small business cycles. In Section 4, we discuss the calibration and our pro-
cedure to calculate the cost of business cycles. The results are presented in Section 5.
The literature is discussed in Section 6 and the last section concludes.
2. Model
In this section, we present our model that is characterized by job heterogeneity, job cre-
ation costs, and an agency problem that affects the ability to implement the first-best
outcome, that is, the agency problem prevents some choices that are valuable from a
social welfare point of view. The particular agency problem is the contractual fragility
problem of Ramey and Watson (1997) that models the collaboration between an em-
ployer and an employee.
Agents and agents’ characteristics. There are two types of agents: workers and en-
trepreneurs. We assume that agents are risk neutral to accentuate that business cycles
2In Section 6, we discuss the related theoretical literature and papers that provide empirical support for
the view that business cycles do not leave the long-run growth path unchanged.
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can be costly even when agents are risk neutral. Workers are indexed by iw and are char-
acterized by productivity φp(iw). For each productivity level there is a continuum of
workers and also a continuum of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are indexed by ie and
are characterized by the amount they have to pay to create a job, φc(ie). We abstract
from matching frictions and assume that for each worker with productivity φp(iw) there
is an entrepreneur who could create the job.3 That is, if the entrepreneur decides to cre-
ate a job, then a relationship can be established instantaneously. This environment can
be simply described as one with a continuum of types of jobs indexed by i, where each
job is characterized by a productivity level, φp(i), and a job creation cost, φc(i).
The values of φp(i) and φc(i) are assumed to be constant through time. That is, all
idiosyncratic uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of time. In Section 7, we clarify
why our results remain valid if these characteristics would be time varying. The joint
distribution of φc and φp has continuous support without point mass. The density is
denoted by f (φcφp). Each period, an individual firm could be hit by an exogenous
shock that will lead to job destruction. This shock occurs with probability 1− ρ. The job
can be recreated by paying the job creation costs again. Production of an active job i,
yt(i), is given by
yt(i)=φp(i)Φpt (1)
where Φpt is aggregate productivity. An unemployed worker receives μ(i) in the form of
home production and/or leisure. For now, we assume that μ(i) is constant, which sim-
plifies the exposition, but later we will assume that μ(i) is proportional to φp(i), which
simplifies the calculations.4 We do not include transfers in the analysis. Unemployment
benefits create a wedge between the private and social benefits of not working. We want
to make clear that our mechanism does not depend on the presence of such a wedge.
From now on, we suppress the i index, but the reader should keep in mind that φp,
φc , and μ are the only exogenous variables that can vary across jobs.
Aggregate fluctuations. Two different assumptions about Φpt are considered. Under the
first assumption, Φpt is constant through time and equal to 1. In this case, jobs are het-
erogeneous, but face an unchanging macroeconomic environment. Under the second
assumption, Φpt is a stochastic variable that varies across time according to the law of
motion specified in Krusell and Smith (1998). In particular, Φpt can take on two values,
Φ+ in a boom and Φ− in a recession. The probability of transitioning out of a boom,
1 − π, is equal to the probability of transitioning out of a recession. This implies that
the expected durations of staying in a boom and a recession are equal to each other.
Moreover, Φ+ − 1= 1−Φ− = ΔΦp , which ensures that E[Φpt] = 1.
3Key in our analysis is the question of how business cycles affect the viability of jobs given their produc-
tivity level, φp(iw), and their startup cost, φc(ie). With matching frictions, it takes on average more than
one vacancy to create a job. For the issues addressed in this paper, this would be similar to an increase in
φc(ie).
4Since the value of μ only matters for jobs with a similar value for φp, it does not matter much which
choice is made for the results.
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Contractual fragility framework of Ramey and Watson (1997). Two types of decisions are
made by entrepreneurs and workers. First, entrepreneurs have to decide whether to pay
φc and to create jobs. Second, members in an ongoing relationship have to choose an
effort level and decide whether they want to continue the relationship. This decision is
affected by contractual fragility as modelled in Ramey and Watson (1997). We start with
the second decision.
In the agency problem of Ramey and Watson (1997), employers and employees have
to decide whether they put in high or low effort. We assume that only the entrepreneur
faces such an effort choice, which simplifies the exposition, but does not affect the anal-
ysis. At the beginning of the period, the worker has to decide whether he stays in the
relationship or whether he quits. If the worker quits, then the job is destroyed. When
making decisions, agents take into account both current-period and future benefits. The
analysis is simplified by the following assumptions: (i) no matching frictions and (ii) bad
behavior by the entrepreneur severs the relationship, but not the job.5,6
Under these assumptions, we can focus on current-period payoffs, which are given
in Table 1. If the entrepreneur chooses high effort, then firm revenues are equal to
φpΦpt , the worker receives the agreed upon wage wt , and the entrepreneur receives the
residual, φpΦpt − wt . Alternatively, the entrepreneur can put in low effort. “Putting in
low effort” should be interpreted broadly. It could mean diversion of funds, but it could
also mean, for example, exploiting the worker or deviating from the original business
plan by taking on additional risk. If the entrepreneur puts in low effort, then firm rev-
enues are equal to φχφpΦpt with φχ < 1, the entrepreneur’s payoff equals χe, and the
worker’s net payoff is equal to φχφpΦpt −χe−χw with χw ≥ 0, where χw is the disutility
imposed on the worker by the low effort choice of the entrepreneur.7 Note that
φpΦpt > φχφpΦpt −χw (2)
Table 1. Current-period payoffs for worker and entrepreneur.
Entrepreneur
High Effort Low Effort
Worker Stay (wtφpΦpt −wt) (φχφpΦpt −χe −χwχe)
Quit (μ0) (μ0)
Notes: If the entrepreneur puts in low effort, then she receives χe instead of the
agreed upon φpΦpt −wt , output is reduced by a factor φχ , and the worker suffers
(additional) disutility of χw .
5If shirking by the entrepreneur also destroys the job, then the net benefit of shirking for the entrepreneur
would be time-varying, since it would include losing the value of the job. This would complicate the expres-
sions, but not the underlying idea that overcoming the agency problem is easier for higher values of Φpt .
6The assumption that shirking severs the relationship means that it is evident that a worker will never
work for less than μ, not even if wage payments below μ are possibly offset by higher payments in the future.
7If bad behavior by the entrepreneur would destroy the job, then this cost would be part of the net ben-
efit χe.
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That is, putting in low effort is harmful when joint benefits are considered. Nevertheless,
it may be optimal for the entrepreneur to put in low effort. If the worker does not quit,
then the entrepreneur is only willing to put in high effort if
φpΦpt −wt ≥ χe (3)
where we use the assumption that the entrepreneur’s choice to put in low effort does not
affect her continuation value.
The worker is only willing to stay in a job if
wt ≥ μ (4)
A necessary and sufficient condition to satisfy both the incentive compatibility con-
dition (3) and the worker participation condition (4) is given by
φpΦpt ≥ χe +μ (5)
If we let χ= χe +μ, then we can write this condition as
φpΦpt ≥ χ (6)
Consistent with the terminology in Ramey and Watson (1997), we refer to the require-
ment given in equation (6) as the effort constraint. If a job does not satisfy this constraint,
then it is not possible for the worker to get at least his outside option. This is known to
the worker, since all relevant information is known at the beginning of the period. Con-
sequently, a worker would not take such a job. Moreover, he would quit if he is in a job
where φpΦpt falls below χ.
The jobs for which the agency problem matters. The interesting jobs are those with a value
for φp such that
μ<φpΦpt < χe +μ= χ
If φpΦpt < μ, then the job does not satisfy the effort constraint, but it would not op-
erate in the first-best solution either. The first-best solution is also implemented if
φpΦpt > χ, because jobs with this level of revenues satisfy the effort constraint. If
μ < φpΦpt < χ, then the job would produce in the first-best solution, but not when
the agents face the agency problem. For these values of φpΦpt , it is not possible to both
pay the entrepreneur enough so that she will not put in low effort and pay the worker
enough so that his wage exceeds μ. In this case, the job is not viable. The idea of the
contractual fragility of Ramey and Watson (1997) is that no verifiable contract can be
written that will prevent the entrepreneur from putting in low effort.8 The entrepreneur
may promise that she will pay the worker a wage above μ and that she will put in high
effort, but if φpΦpt < χe + μ, then the entrepreneur cannot both pay the worker more
8For example, even when it is “observed” that the entrepreneur puts in low effort, this would not provide
any evidence that could be used in court.
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than μ and satisfy her own incentive compatibility condition. The worker knows that the
entrepreneur will face this dilemma and will go for his outside option and earn μ.
The cutoff level for φp. Let φ˜pbc(Φpt) be the value of φp such that equation (6) holds
with equality when there are business cycles, that is, when ΔΦp > 0. Thus,
φ˜pbc(Φpt)Φpt = χ or φ˜pbc(Φpt)= χ
Φpt

Consequently, the fraction of jobs that do not satisfy the effort constraint decreases in a
boom and increases in a recession. If χ is not constant, then φ˜pbc(Φpt) remains coun-
tercyclical as long as the effect of Φpt on regular market production is stronger than the
effect on the benefits associated with low effort.9
Job creation decision and wage setting. Jobs can be created by paying a start-up cost, φc .
When a job has been inactive, then φc would have to be paid once more to restart it. That
is, one cannot simply mothball a job and restart it as if there had been no interruption.
One possible reason for this is that it may take some time and effort before the job is
operating at its potential productivity of φp again.
In our framework, the entrepreneur pays the job creation costs and compares these
costs with the net discounted value (NPV) of the revenues she receives. Entry occurs
whenever
Nebc(φcφp1Φpt)−φc ≥ βEt
[
Nebc(φcφp0Φpt+1)
]

where Nebc(φcφp1Φpt) is the discounted value of the job’s current and future earn-
ings accruing to the entrepreneur when the job creation costs have been paid, and
Nebc(φcφp0Φpt) is the discounted value of earnings when the job creation costs
have not been paid.10 The bc (no-bc) subscript indicates that the value refers to the case
with (without) business cycles. When the job creation costs are not paid, it remains pos-
sible to create the job at a future date. Job creation decisions are efficient if entry occurs
whenever
Nbc(φcφp1Φpt)−φc ≥ μ+βEt
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt+1)
]
 (7)
where the discounted values now pertain to joint earnings. We denote the cutoff
level of φc by φ˜∗cbc(φpΦpt) when the job is affected by the agency problem and by
φ˜cbc(φpΦpt) when it is not. We use different notation, because the agency problem
affects the cutoff level for φc as discussed in detail below.
The entrepreneur receives a share ωe of the surplus, φpΦpt −μ. We present results
for two cases. In the first case, wages are such that the job creation decision is efficient.
9Interestingly, all that is needed for our story to work is that φ˜pbc(Φpt) is cyclical, either procyclical or
countercyclical. The only case that has to be ruled out is that the benefits associated with low effort are
proportional to Φpt . In that case, business cycles would not shorten the expected job duration.
10Precise definitions and derivations can be found in Appendices A and B. The value of
Nebc(φpφc0Φpt ) is equal to Nebc(φpφc1Φpt ) − φc when entry is optimal in the current period
and is equal to βEt [Nebc(φpφc0Φpt+1)] when entry is not optimal in the current period.
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This would happen, for example, if ωe = 1 and the wage rate is equal to μ. Efficient job
entry would not be jeopardized if wages exceed μ as long as the value of φp (φc) is suf-
ficiently high (low). If the job creation decision is efficient, then changes in the wage
rule correspond to transfers among (risk neutral) agents that do not affect our per capita
welfare calculations. When ωe = 1, average job creation costs turn out to be implausi-
bly high. The main reason to consider this case is to make clear that business cycles are
costly even if the job creation decision is efficient. We also consider the case when the
entrepreneur receives a smaller (and more realistic) share of the revenues. Then entry is
no longer efficient for all jobs, and the average of job creation costs takes on plausible
values.
Welfare loss measure. We measure the impact of business cycles on individual jobs as
the permanent increase (or decrease) in per-period income that would make the en-
trepreneur and the worker in a world with business cycles as well off as they would be
in a world without business cycles. To standardize the measure, we scale by market pro-
duction, φp. The formula is given in the following definition.
Definition 1. The impact of business cycles on an individual job is given by
L(φcφpΔΦp)= (1−β)
(
Nno-bc(φcφp0)−E[Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)]
φp
)

where Nno-bc(φcφp0) is the discounted value of earnings in a world without business
cycles when the job creation cost has not been paid and
E
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)
]= (Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp))
2

The aggregate welfare measure is obtained by aggregating the individual losses rela-
tive to aggregate output, that is,
L(ΔΦp)=
∫ ∫
L(φcφpΔΦp)φpf(φcφp)dφc dφp
Y

where Y is an output measure.11
Our welfare measure compares the benefits of a job that has not yet been created
in a world with business cycles to the benefits of a job that has not yet been created in
a world without business cycles. We do not compare the output levels. The motivation
is the following. Below, we will see that output will be lower in a world with business
cycles, because some jobs are not created in a world with business cycles. To assess the
cost of business cycles properly, one should not just compare output levels; one should
take into account the beneficial aspect that the economy with business cycles does not
have to incur the cost of creating those jobs.
11The precise definition is given in Appendix C.1.
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3. Model properties
In this section, we describe the qualitative features of the model. We start in Section 3.1
with a graphical representation of the affected groups. In Section 3.2, we discuss the
impact of arbitrarily small aggregate fluctuations. In Section 3.3, we discuss the results if
aggregate fluctuations take on nontrivial amplitudes. In Section 3.4, we discuss the case
when the job entry decision is not efficient.
3.1 Graphical representation of affected jobs
We start by presenting the case without business cycles. Also, we describe the model
when job creation is efficient to highlight that our mechanism does not rely on ineffi-
cient job creation. If Φpt is constant, then a job either always satisfies the effort con-
straint or never satisfies it. That is, the cutoff level for job productivity, φp, is constant
and is given by
φ˜pno-bc = χ (8)
Jobs with a value of φp high enough to overcome the contractual fragility problem will
be created as long as the job creation costs are low enough. We denote the cutoff level
for φc in a world without business cycles by φ˜cno-bc(φp). It is the level of φc for which
equation (7) holds with equality. This implies that
φ˜cno-bc(φp)=
φp −μ
1−βρ  (9)
The graphs in this section are based on the assumption that μ is the same for all jobs.
Figure 1 displays the results when there are no business cycles. Jobs in the shaded area
are created and produce market output, since their value of φp exceeds χ and their job
creation costs are low enough. If the effort constraint is not satisfied, then job creation
will not occur, no matter how low the job creation costs are.
Figure 2 shows the case with business cycles. Since agents are risk neutral, busi-
ness cycles only affect agents’ utility if aggregate fluctuations lead to different decisions.
There are two types of jobs that are affected by business cycles.
Timed-entry and fragile jobs. The first type of job that is affected by business cycles is
a “timed-entry” job. Timed-entry jobs are jobs that (i) have a value of φp that is such
that they are never affected by the agency problem and (ii) have a value of φc such that
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−) < φc ≤ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+), that is, jobs are created during booms but not dur-
ing recessions. Timed-entry jobs for which φc > φ˜cno-bc(φp) (φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)) are
never (always) created in a world without business cycles, whereas they are only cre-
ated during booms in a world with business cycles. Business cycles only affect the job
creation decision of timed-entry jobs. A timed-entry job that already has been created
continues to operate—independent of the state of the aggregate economy—until it is hit
by an exogenous destruction shock.
The second type of job affected by business cycles is a “fragile” job. These jobs have a
value of φp such that the effort constraint is not satisfied in a recession, but is satisfied in
306 Den Haan and Sedlacek Quantitative Economics 5 (2014)
Figure 1. Jobs that operate in a world without business cycles. Notes: The shaded area in this
graph indicates the jobs that (i) have a high enough value for job productivity, φp, to satisfy the
effort constraint, φp ≥ χ, and (ii) have a low enough value for job creation costs, φc , so that job
creation is profitable. The graph is based on the assumption that μ is the same for all jobs.
a boom. These jobs are clearly affected by business cycles. Jobs with a value for φp such
that φ˜pbc(Φ+) ≤ φp < φ˜pno-bc never satisfy the effort constraint in a world without
business cycles, whereas they can (cannot) overcome the effort constraint during booms
(recessions) in a world with business cycles. Jobs with a value for φp such that φ˜pno-bc ≤
φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−) are different in that they always satisfy the effort constraint in a world
without business cycles, but are similar in that they can (cannot) overcome the effort
constraint during booms (recessions) in a world with business cycles. To understand
the consequences of business cycles, it is important to take into account job creation
costs.
Fragile jobs and job creation costs. Consider two fragile jobs, both with zero job creation
costs. One has a value of φp just above φ˜pno-bc and one has a value of φp just below
φ˜pno-bc. The job with a value of φp just below φ˜pno-bc gains from business cycles, be-
cause it can overcome the effort constraint during a boom and during that time period it
earns a strictly positive surplus of φp −μ. By contrast, it can never satisfy the effort con-
straint in a world without business cycles. The job with a value of φp just above φ˜pno-bc
is the mirror image. Business cycles are bad for this job, because the effort constraint is
no longer satisfied all the time. For the pair there is a net loss, since the job that is tem-
porarily made impossible by business cycles has a slightly higher value for φp than the
job that is temporarily made possible. This effect of business cycles, due to affected jobs
having different values of φp, turns out to be quantitatively not important.
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Figure 2. Jobs affected by business cycles. Notes: The term φp is job productivity and φc is job
creation cost; Φ− (Φ+) is the value of aggregate productivity in a recession (boom); φ˜p is the
lowest value of φp that satisfies the effort constraint; φ˜∗c (φ˜c) is the highest value of φc such that
the entrepreneur wants to create the job if business cycles do (do not) shorten job duration be-
cause of the agency problem. The shaded areas in this graph indicate the jobs that are affected
by business cycles. Light grey denotes cyclical fragile jobs that satisfy the effort constraint during
a boom and do not satisfy it during a recession in a world with business cycles. Moreover, job
creation costs are low enough so that these jobs operate during booms. Jobs in the “gain” (“loss”)
area never (always) operate in a world without business cycles. The darker grey denotes perma-
nent-loss fragile jobs that satisfy the effort constraint during a boom, but their job creation costs
are too high to make creating the job worthwhile given that the agency problem will force termi-
nation during a recession. The darkest grey denotes timed-entry jobs. The graph is based on the
assumption that μ is the same for all jobs.
Now consider fragile jobs with job creation costs that are positive, but low enough
to ensure job creation even if job duration is shortened by business cycles. That is,
φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+). These jobs are referred to as cyclical fragile jobs, since they only
operate during booms. Business cycles improve (worsen) welfare for these jobs when
φp is just below (above) φ˜pno-bc. In Figure 2, these two types of fragile jobs are in the
regions referred to as “gain” and “loss.” In contrast to the case with zero job creation
costs, the gains do not offset the losses when the job creation costs are positive even
when the output differential between the two jobs is negligible. This will be discussed in
Section 3.2.
Consider fragile jobs with a value of φp above φ˜pno-bc. Since these are fragile jobs,
they stop operating whenever the economy enters a recession, which implies that their
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expected duration is shorter in the presence of business cycles. This means that business
cycles reduce these jobs’ cutoff values for φc . That is, φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+) < φ˜cno-bc(φp). In
other words, the reduction in the expected duration implies that for some jobs it is no
longer worth it to pay the job creation costs even though it is worth doing so in a world
without business cycles. This loss turns out to be the most important part of the cost
of business cycles. These fragile jobs are in the area referred to as permanent loss. In
contrast to cyclical fragile jobs, which have a value of φc below φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), there are
only losses, namely for fragile jobs with a value of φp above φ˜pno-bc. Jobs with a value
of φp below φ˜pno-bc and a value of φc above φ˜
∗
cbc(φpΦ+) are never created in a world
without business cycles or in a world with business cycles.
3.2 The impact of arbitrarily small business cycles
The discussion in the last paragraph already makes clear that some jobs are better off
and some jobs are worse off in the presence of business cycles. Here we analyze these
gains and losses formally by considering arbitrarily small business cycles. By considering
arbitrarily small business cycles, we can derive relatively simple analytical expressions
with which we can compare the different outcomes, for example, the gains and losses
of cyclical fragile jobs. The analysis based on arbitrarily small business cycles also high-
lights another feature of our setup, namely a discontinuity. That is, when the magnitude
of business cycles approaches—but remains distinct from—zero, then some effects of
business cycles approach zero, whereas some effects do not and, in fact, can remain
quite large. This discontinuity plays an important role in the quantitative analysis of this
paper.
“Weak-inequality” and “strict-inequality” jobs. In this section, we analyze the impact on
the economy when the magnitude of aggregate fluctuations, ΔΦp , increases from 0 to an
arbitrarily small number. When considering nontrivial values for ΔΦp , it does not matter
whether the inequality in the effort constraint is a weak or a strict inequality, unless
there happens to be point mass exactly at φp = χ, which we rule out by assumption.
When considering arbitrarily small values for ΔΦp , however, it does matter whether the
effort constraint is written with a weak or a strict inequality.12 We remove the ambiguity
by assuming that there are two types of jobs. There is one type of job that has to satisfy
the effort constraint with a weak inequality (as in equation (6)) and one type of job that
has to satisfy the effort constraint with a strict inequality.13 This is made precise in the
following definition.
Definition 2. For each combination of φc and φp, there is one type of job with an
effort constraint given by
φpΦpt ≥ χ (10)
12Consider a job with φp = χ and an arbitrarily small drop in Φpt starting at Φpt = 1. If the constraint
is written as φpΦpt ≥ χ, then the job satisfies the constraint before the drop in Φpt , but not after. If the
constraint is written as φpΦpt > χ, then this same job satisfies the constraint neither before nor after the
drop.
13The distribution of φc and φp is assumed to be the same for both types of jobs.
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and one type of job with an effort constraint given by
φpΦpt > χ (11)
Jobs with φp = χ facing the effort constraint given in equation (10) are referred to as
weak-inequality jobs. Similarly, jobs facing the effort constraint given in equation (11)
are referred to as strict-inequality jobs.
Whenever φp = χ, then there is no difference between the two types of jobs. Con-
sequently, we only use the terms weak inequality and strict inequality when φp = χ.
Moreover, even when φp = χ, these two types of jobs only differ when Φpt = 1. In par-
ticular, both jobs satisfy the effort constraint whenever Φpt > 1 and both do not satisfy
the effort constraint whenever Φpt < 1. Thus, both are fragile jobs. This setup with both
weak- and strict-inequality constraints not only gets rid of the ambiguity in writing the
effort constraint, but it also ensures that the case with arbitrarily small business cycles
covers all the ways through which nontrivial business cycles affect fragile jobs, that is,
as indicated in Figure 2. In particular, strict-inequality jobs are similar to the fragile jobs
with φp < φ˜pno-bc in the gain area and weak-inequality jobs are similar to the fragile
jobs with φp > φ˜pno-bc in the loss or permanent loss area (depending on their value
for φc).
Assumption 1. We have
μ= μˆφp
This assumption greatly simplifies the algebra.14 What matters quantitatively for the
results are the unemployment benefits of those jobs that cannot overcome the agency
problem in a boom. These jobs have similar φp values. Consequently, the value of μ =
μˆφp does not vary much across those jobs for which the level of unemployment benefits
matter.
Assumption 2. We have
(i) 0<β< 1 0< ρ< 1 0<π < 1 φc ≥ 0
(ii)
(1+ΔΦp)χ− μˆχ
1−βρπ <
χ− μˆχ
1−βρ 
(iii)
χ−μ
χ
= χ− μˆχ
χ
> ΔΦp
(12)
The first part of the assumption simply ensures that parameters do not take on non-
sensical values. The second part affects fragile jobs. It ensures that the NPV of the se-
quence of surplus values a job is expected to generate during one single stretch of high
14If μ is proportional to φp, then the different cutoff levels for φc as a function of φp would no longer be
parallel lines, as displayed in Figures 1 and 2, but would all start at the origin and increase with a different
slope.
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Φ+ values does not exceed the NPV of the sequence of surplus values this job is expected
to generate over its natural life if there are no business cycles to end it prematurely.
The condition could be violated if booms make jobs extraordinarily productive. This is
a weak assumption.15 The third part of this assumption requires that the key variable of
the agency problem, χ, is not too close to the value of μ. This assumption simplifies the
analysis and ensures that the agency problem remains relevant for determining cutoff
values over the business cycles for all affected jobs.
Cost of arbitrarily small business cycles for individual jobs. Cutoff levels are continuous
functions of ΔΦp . Consequently, arbitrarily small business cycles can only affect jobs at
the cutoff values for φp or φc . The following proposition describes the result for timed-
entry jobs.16
Proposition 1 (Welfare Impact for Timed-Entry Jobs at the No-Business-Cycles Cutoff
Levels When ΔΦp → 0). Suppose that (i) φc = φ˜cno-bc, (ii) φp > φ˜pbc(Φ−), (iii) ωe = 1,
and (iv) Assumption 2(i) holds. Then
lim
ΔΦp→0
L(φcφpΔΦp)= 0
If the job creation decision is efficient, then all timed-entry jobs benefit from the
presence of business cycles, that is, L(φcφpΔΦp) < 0. The reason is that for timed-
entry jobs, the job creation decisions in a world with business cycles could be the same
as the decisions made in a world without business cycles, that is, always create the job
when φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp) and never create the job when φc > φ˜cno-bc(φp). These ben-
efits are proportional to ΔΦp .
17 Consequently, they approach zero as the magnitude of
business cycles approaches zero. Since agents are risk neutral and these jobs face no
frictions, it is not surprising that L(·) is negative-valued and a smooth function.
The next proposition describes the impact of arbitrarily small business cycles for
fragile jobs. Proposition 3 in Appendix A gives the more cumbersome formulas for the
impact of business cycles of nontrivial magnitude.
Proposition 2 (Welfare Impact for Fragile Jobs at the No-Business-Cycles Cutoff When
ΔΦp → 0). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then the change in welfare
due to introducing arbitrarily small business cycles is given by the following expressions.
15To see that this is a weak assumption, suppose that β = 099, ρ = 095, and π = 0875. For these pa-
rameter values, the condition is satisfied as long as the surplus in a boom is not more than 298% above the
surplus value in a world without business cycles.
16Proofs of the propositions are given in Appendix B.
17In particular, when φc = φ˜cno-bc, then
L(φcφpΔΦp)= −
(1−βρ)
2(1−βρπ)ΔΦp 
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(i) For weak-inequality jobs with φp = φ˜pno-bc, limΔΦp→0L(φcφpΔΦp) is given by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− μˆ
2
+ φc
φp
(
1−βρπ − 2(1−βρ)
2
)
> 0
if 0≤φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)
1− (1−βρ) φc
φp
− μˆ > 0 if φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+) < φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)
0 if φc ≥ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
(ii) For strict-inequality jobs with φp = φ˜pno-bc, limΔΦp→0L(φcφpΔΦp) is given by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
μˆ− 1
2
+ φc
φp
(
1−βρπ
2
)
< 0 if 0≤φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)
0 if φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+) < φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)
0 if φc ≥ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
(iii) The total impact of arbitrarily small changes on a weak- and a strict-inequality
job is given by
lim
ΔΦp→0
L(φcφpΔΦp)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φc
φp
βρ(1−π)= 0 if φc = 0
φc
φp
βρ(1−π) > 0 if 0<φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)
1− (1−βρ) φc
φp
− μˆ > 0 if φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+) < φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)
0 if φc ≥ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
In contrast to the results for timed-entry jobs, the consequences of business cycles
for affected jobs do not approach zero as the magnitude of business cycles becomes ar-
bitrarily small. The reason is that business cycles—even if they are very small—affect
whether jobs can or cannot satisfy the effort constraint. And this aspect generates a dis-
crete change in the agents’ welfare. The importance of this discontinuity will be dis-
cussed in detail in Section 5.2.
For the discussion that follows, it may be helpful to remember that the idea behind
the setup with weak- and strict-inequality jobs is to have one job that just does and one
job that just does not satisfy the effort constraint in a world without business cycles,
but that have the same value for φp. In a world with business cycles, both types of jobs
satisfy the effort constraint in a boom, but not in a recession.
If φc = 0, then weak- (strict-) inequality jobs are negatively (positively) affected by
business cycles. The combined impact is zero, since the extra surplus gained by a strict-
inequality job in a boom is exactly offset by the surplus lost by a weak-inequality job in a
recession, whereas the increased frequency of job creation does not carry a cost if φc = 0.
If 0 < φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), then the gains of the strict-inequality job are outweighed by
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the losses of the weak-inequality jobs, resulting in a net loss.18 For this case, φc remains
low enough to warrant job entry whenever the effort constraint is satisfied. Since φc > 0,
it matters how often job creation costs are being paid. The strict-inequality job pays
job creation costs more often in a world with than in a world without business cycles,
since these jobs are never created in a world without business cycles. Whether weak-
inequality jobs pay job creations costs more often depends on parameter values.19 The
last part of the proposition makes clear, however, that the combined effect on a weak-
and strict-inequality job is an unambiguous loss. In a world without business cycles, one
of the two jobs pays the entry cost at the beginning of time, namely the weak-inequality
job. In a world with business cycles, both jobs pay the entry cost at the beginning of time
in a boom and neither do in a recession. The expected initial cost is, thus, the same. The
expected job duration is shorter, however, in a world with business cycles. Consequently,
job creation costs are paid more often.
If φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+) < φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp), then there is no longer a gain of the strict-
inequality jobs to partially offset the losses of the weak-inequality jobs. If φc =
φ˜cno-bc(φp), then job creation could occur in a world without business cycles, but the
benefits are the same as not creating the job, which is the outcome in the world with
business cycles. Thus, there are no welfare consequences. There are also none when
φc > φ˜cno-bc(φp).
3.3 The impact of typical business cycles
If aggregate fluctuations are not arbitrarily small, then the range of affected jobs in-
creases. This is true for fragile and for timed-entry jobs. However, the case described
above with arbitrarily small values for ΔΦp already describes the different ways in which
business cycles can affect jobs.
Fragile jobs. If ΔΦp is arbitrarily small, then only jobs with φp = χ are fragile jobs. By con-
trast, for nontrivial values of ΔΦp , jobs with a range of values for φp are fragile, namely
jobs with a value of φp such that φ˜pbc(Φ+) ≤ φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−). Jobs with a value of φp
such that φ˜pbc(Φ+) ≤ φp < φ˜pno-bc are jobs that never satisfy the effort constraint in
a world without business cycles; these jobs are affected by business cycles in exactly
the same way as strict-inequality jobs in the discussion above. That is, business cycles
are beneficial for these jobs since the occasionally higher value of Φpt allows them
to satisfy the effort constraint when that happens. Jobs with a value of φp such that
φ˜pno-bc ≤ φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−) are jobs that always satisfy the effort constraint in a world
without business cycles; these jobs are affected by business cycles in exactly the same
way as weak-inequality jobs in the discussion above. That is, business cycles are harmful
for these jobs because in the presence of business cycles, these jobs either never operate
or operate only during recessions.
18Recall that the value of φp is the same for a weak- and a strict-inequality job.
19The dependence is clear by considering extreme parameter values. In particular, if ρ = 1 (ρ = 0), then
job creation costs are paid more (less) often in a world with business cycles.
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There is one effect that is present for nontrivial values of ΔΦp that is not present
for arbitrarily small values. If ΔΦp is arbitrarily small, then the output level of jobs that
satisfy the effort constraint during a boom is equal to the output level of jobs that no
longer satisfy the effort constraint during a recession. That output level is equal to χ.
The output gained thus offsets the output lost. For nontrivial values of ΔΦp , the output
levels of jobs that start producing during a boom is less than χ while the output levels
of jobs that stop producing during a recession is more than χ. But quantitatively this
effect is small. The reason is that fluctuations in Φpt are not very large, which means
that φ˜pbc(Φpt) does not vary that much, which in turn implies that there is not that
much variation in the value φp in between the two cutoff points. However, if there are
cyclical jobs with values of φp above φ˜pno-bc, but no cyclical jobs with values of φp
below φ˜pno-bc, then this would break the symmetry and increase the cost of business
cycles. When calibrating the model, we assume, however, that the mass of jobs below
φ˜pno-bc is not smaller than the mass of jobs above, so we abstract from this possible
reason for costly business cycles.
Timed-entry jobs. When ΔΦp > 0, there is a band of timed-entry jobs around the job
creation cost cutoff level, φ˜cno-bc(φp), namely those jobs for which φ˜c(φpΦ−) < φc ≤
φ˜c(φpΦ+). These jobs are created during booms, but not during recessions. Jobs with
a value of φc such that φ˜cno-bc(φp) < φc < φ˜c(φpΦ+) benefit from business cycles
because the higher value of Φpt during a boom makes entry worthwhile. The higher
the value of φc , the lower the value of this benefit. Jobs with a value of φc such that
φ˜c(φpΦ−) < φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp) also benefit from business cycles. For these jobs, the
welfare loss of a recession is not as high as the welfare gain of a boom. The reason is that
these jobs lower the consequences of a recession by delaying job creation. The lower the
value of φc , the lower the benefit of paying φc in the future.
3.4 The impact of business cycles with inefficient job creation
In the discussion above, we assumed that the entrepreneur’s share of the surplus, ωe,
is equal to 1, which is a sufficient condition for job creation to be efficient. By focusing
on efficient job creation, we made clear that our reason for costly business cycles does
not depend on job creation being inefficient. As ωe gets smaller, the cutoff levels in Fig-
ure 2 decrease proportionally. Qualitatively, the picture, thus, remains the same and we
can still identify the same types of affected jobs. There are some differences regarding
welfare consequences, however, especially for timed-entry jobs.
Inefficient job creation and timed-entry jobs. Above we argued that business cycles have
a positive effect on timed-entry jobs. The reason is that the option to delay job creation
during a recession creates value to the entrepreneur. If job creation is efficient, then this
must also create value to the relationship as a whole. If job creation is not efficient, then
the decision to delay still creates value for the entrepreneur. But this is not necessarily
beneficial for the worker, since the entrepreneur ignores the benefits that accrue to the
worker. Consequently, if ωe is sufficiently low, then business cycles are costly for timed-
entry jobs with a value of φc such that φ˜cbc(φpΦ−) < φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp). These jobs are
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always immediately created in a world without business cycles, whereas creation is de-
layed during recessions in a world with business cycles. Business cycles remain benefi-
cial for timed-entry jobs with a value of φc such that φ˜cno-bc(φp) < φc ≤ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+).
These jobs are never created in a world without business cycles, but they are created
during a boom in a world with business cycles. If job creation is inefficient, then the re-
lationship as a whole would benefit from job creation. Consequently, the creation dur-
ing booms in a world with business cycles is welfare improving even though a further
improvement would be possible if job creation would not be postponed during reces-
sions.
Inefficient job creation and fragile jobs. The cutoff level for φc relative to φp is smaller
for lower values of ωe. This is important for the cost of business cycles for the follow-
ing reasons. For cyclical fragile jobs, job creation costs are paid more often in a world
with business cycles. Consequently, lower values of φc relative to φp lower the cost of
business cycles. For permanent-loss fragile jobs, job creation costs are no longer paid
at all in a world with business cycles. This aspect dampens the negative impact of hav-
ing permanent-loss fragile jobs. But this positive aspect is small when φc is low relative
to φp. In our numerical examples, this second effect tends to dominate so that a de-
crease in ωe increases the cost of business cycles.
4. Calculating the cost of business cycles
In this section, we describe the procedure used to calculate the cost of business cycles.
The calibration procedure is based on U.S. data and is described in Section 4.1. The
second subsection describes the steps taken to calculate the cost of business cycles. Ap-
pendix C contains the derivation of the formulas.
4.1 Calibration procedure
We start by presenting our choice for commonly used parameters. Next, we describe ad-
ditional assumptions and calibration targets. Some targets are not easily pinned down
by empirical measures. An example is the upper bound on the conditional distribution
of φc , f (φc|φp). In our calibration, there are four such model characteristics for which
the values of the empirical counterpart are uncertain. Although we have some informa-
tion about their values, it is not precise enough to choose values with sufficient confi-
dence. Consequently, we present results for a wide range of values for these uncertain
targets.
4.1.1 Values for standard parameters The period is a quarter and we set the value of β
equal to 099. The value for μ indicates the value generated by an inactive job. Shimer
(2005) used a value for “not working” that is equal to 40% of market production, but his
measure refers to all benefits that an unemployed worker receives, whereas here μ indi-
cates the value produced by the inactive worker himself. As our benchmark, we assume
that half of the number used by Shimer (2005) consists of actual net benefits generated
by an unemployed worker. That is, we assume that μ= μˆφp with μˆ= 02. The value used
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by Shimer (2005) is considered to be too low by some.20 Hall (2006) estimated the flow
value of leisure forgone to be equal to 43%, and we consider this as an alternative esti-
mate. We follow Krusell and Smith (1998) and set π equal to 0875, which means that the
expected duration of a boom and a recession is equal to eight quarters, and we set ΔΦp
equal to 001.21 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median years of tenure
for U.S. workers aged 25 years and over varied between 47 and 52 years from 1996 to
2010. We set ρ = 1 − ln(2)/20 = 09653, which would imply a median job duration of 20
quarters if no jobs are affected by business cycles. In our model, some jobs’ duration is
shortened by business cycles. The necessary adjustment depends on the particular case
considered, but is never large.22 Moreover, the adjustment would mean using a higher
value for ρ, and the higher the value for ρ, the higher the cost of business cycles. Conse-
quently, our choice for ρ is conservative.
4.1.2 Additional assumptions and calibration targets A reduction in the entrepreneur’s
share, ωe, reduces the cutoff levels for φc and, thus, average job creation costs. In the
literature, there are some estimates for average job creation costs and we will use these
estimates to determine ωe. Unfortunately, the estimates vary quite a bit. Therefore, we
consider this statistic as one of the four uncertain ones. The estimate based on Silva and
Toledo (2009) implies a job creation cost of 1245 times quarterly output.23 By contrast,
Shimer (2005) reported a value of only 0157% of quarterly output.24 This number is not
based on direct evidence, but is calibrated to fit model characteristics. We calculate the
cost of business cycles for both estimates of the average job creation costs.
Determining the joint density f (φcφp) would be difficult. As mentioned above, we
do not even have accurate information about the mean of φc . Moreover, what matters
for our quantitative results is not some rough global description of the distribution, but
information about the mass in relatively small areas, including information about jobs
20See Mortensen and Nagypál (2007) for a discussion.
21We checked the assumptions regarding the duration using (Hodrick–Prescott) HP-filtered residuals for
gross domestic product (GDP). Within our sample from 1947Q1 to 2010Q4, we find that from 1949Q1 to
2008Q3 there are 16 complete recessions (periods with negative HP-filtered residuals surrounded by posi-
tive residuals) and 16 complete booms (periods with positive HP-filtered residuals surrounded by negative
values). The average durations are equal to 71 and 79 quarters for recessions and booms, respectively. This
corresponds roughly to the assumption adopted here that the expected duration of a boom is roughly equal
to the expected duration of a recession. Moreover, this corresponds closely to an expected duration of eight
quarters adopted by Krusell and Smith (1998).
22To see that the downward bias is small, suppose that all of the observed fluctuations in the extensive
employment margin are due to (low-duration) fragile jobs and none to (high-duration) timed-entry jobs.
Under this assumption, we get the largest possible bias. This assumption implies that 00776 (which is, as
discussed below, our estimate for the change in employment over the business cycle) is equal to
EC-fragile
EC-fragile+E .
These jobs exist half of the time. The median job duration is then equal to the value of the cumulative
distribution function at 050− 00776/2, which is equal to 1782 quarters.
23This consists of two parts. First, the total cost of hiring a person is 36% of the quarterly wage, which
corresponds to 24% of quarterly output using a standard labor share value. Second, productivity losses and
training costs during the first year are 31% of output in each quarter. The discounted value of this cost is
equal to
∑3
i=0 031βi = 12215.
24In particular, the flow cost of vacancy posting is 0213 and the vacancy filling probability is 1355.
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that only operate in the world we do not live in, that is, the world without business cy-
cles. Also, strictly speaking we need the joint distribution of φc , φp, and χ, because one
would think that χ is not the same for all jobs. Instead of specifying a distribution for
the complete distribution of job-specific characteristics, we take a stand on just a lim-
ited set of aspects of the distribution and combine this with an estimate for observed
employment fluctuations along the extensive margin. This turns out to be enough to
calculate the cost of business cycles.
The observed standard deviation of detrended employment is equal to 388%.25 We
use this statistic to pin down the mass of cyclical fragile jobs that are destroyed in a re-
cession. In our model, these detrended employment fluctuations correspond to cyclical
fragile jobs as well as timed-entry jobs that are exogenously destroyed during the reces-
sion and not being recreated. If there would be no timed-entry jobs, then the mass of
fragile jobs would be 2 × 388% = 776%, since a 776% difference in the recession and
boom employment levels gives a standard deviation of 388%. To take the behavior of
timed-entry jobs into account, we do the following. The expected duration of a down-
turn is equal to eight quarters. Consequently, to get the mass of fragile jobs, we subtract
from 776% the expected number of timed-entry jobs that disappear in eight quarters.
We make the following two assumptions regarding the distribution of φc and φp.
Assumption 3. We have
∫ φ˜pno-bc
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
f (φcφp)dφp ≤
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
f (φcφp)dφp
Sufficient for this inequality to hold is that the density f (φp|φc) is nondecreasing
for values of φp such that φ˜pbc(Φ+)≤φp ≤ φ˜pbc(Φ−). Since φ˜pbc(Φ+) and φ˜pbc(Φ−)
are likely to be located in the left tail of the distribution, the density is unlikely to be
decreasing around these values.
Assumption 4. The density f (φc|φp) is uniformly distributed on [φc(φp)φc(φp)].
Both the lower bound and the upper bound of f (φc|φp) are important parameters in
determining the cost of business cycles. For example, if the upper bound is sufficiently
low, then there are no permanent-loss fragile jobs. These bounds are the second and
third of our four uncertain targets. For both bounds, we consider two quite different
values.
Regarding the upper bound, φc(φp), our preferred choice is to assume that the up-
per bound is not less than φ˜cbc(φpΦ+), that is, the cutoff level if job duration is not
shortened by business cycles. If the upper bound of the distribution would be less than
this cutoff value, then there are no jobs at all that are too costly to be created. This
seems impossible. Consequently, our preferred value for φc(φp) is a value not less than
25We use U.S. total nonfarm employment from 1948Q1 to 2007Q4. If the sample is extended to 2010Q4,
then this number increases to 00487. We use a linear trend to detrend the data, that is, we calculate the cost
of business cycles relative to the case in which there is a constant growth rate.
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φ˜cbc(φpΦ+). Since jobs above the highest cutoff level, φ˜cbc(φpΦ+), are not affected
by business cycles, it does not matter whether we set φc(φp) equal to φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) or
to any higher level. For simplicity, we set φc(φp)= φ˜cbc(φpΦ+).
The assumption that φc(φp) ≥ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) implies that all possible permanent-
loss fragile jobs are in the domain of the distribution. As an alternative, we set φc(φp)
such that half of all permanent-loss fragile jobs do not exist, that is, we set φc(φp) equal
to the average of the cutoff level when job duration is and when it is not affected by the
agency problem, 12(φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)).
Regarding the lower bound we also consider two quite different values. The first is 0.
This means that there are jobs that can be created at no or little cost. This may not be
realistic. As an alternative, we consider φ
c
(φp)= 12 φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), which halves the mass
of cyclical fragile jobs.
Besides Assumption 3, which is a very weak assumption, we only make one addi-
tional assumption about the distribution of φp. That is, we assume that the productiv-
ity of cyclical fragile jobs relative to the productivity of jobs not affected by the agency
problem, that is, jobs such that φp ≥ φ˜pbc(Φ−), takes on a certain value. This is the
fourth of our four uncertain targets. We consider two values. The first is based on the
assumption that nonfragile workers are on average as productive as college graduates
and fragile workers are on average as productive as those without a college degree. This
would imply that fragile workers are on average half as productive as nonfragile work-
ers.26 The property that fragile workers are only found in the bottom of the distribution
of φp is not necessarily true if χ is not the same across all jobs. To simplify the exposi-
tion, we assumed that χ did not vary with φp, but one can easily imagine that it does.
Moreover, if fragile jobs are substantially less productive than other jobs, then the Solow
residual would no longer be procyclical. This composition effect could be substantial.27
Therefore, we also consider the case in which fragile jobs have on average the same pro-
ductivity as nonfragile jobs and fragility is due to a high value of χ. In this case, the Solow
residual is equal to Φpt .
No need to calibrate χ. Our calibration procedure does not require taking a stand on
the value for χ. Moreover, our calibration procedure allows the underlying model to be
such that χ is not the same for all jobs. We consider this to be a big advantage, since
there is no clear empirical counterpart for χ. Moreover, although we have presented
our model using one particular agency problem, our reasoning carries over to different
types of agency problems for which χ would have a different interpretation.28 We will
discuss this in more detail below and in Appendix C, but the reason why we do not have
to take a stand on the distribution of χ is roughly the following. Instead of taking a stand
26See Goldin and Katz (2008).
27For example, suppose that half of the observed employment fluctuations are due to fragile jobs and
suppose that these are half as productive. Then the recession value of the Solow residual is 1− ΔΦp = 099
and the boom value is only slightly higher, namely (1+Δφp +(00776/2)(1+ΔΦp)/2)/(1+00776/2)= 09911,
where 00776 is our estimate for the total change in employment over the business cycle.
28In Appendix A.2 of Den Haan and Sedlacek (2009), we worked out the case in which the agency problem
is related to firm financing.
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on the distribution of χ, φc , and φp across jobs, and to directly calculate the mass of
cyclical and permanent-loss fragile jobs, we use the assumptions made above on the
distribution ofφc andφp to directly calculate the mass of timed-entry jobs relative to the
mass of regular jobs, that is, nonfragile jobs that are also not timed-entry jobs. Timed-
entry jobs are not affected by χ and we do not need information about χ to calculate this
fraction. Given the amount of observed employment adjustment along the extensive
margin and given the calculated mass of timed-entry jobs, we can then determine the
mass of cyclical fragile jobs as the residual between the two. Given the mass of cyclical
fragile jobs and given our assumption on f (φc|φp), it is then straightforward to calculate
the mass of permanent-loss fragile jobs.
4.2 Steps to calculate cost of business cycles
Calculating the cost of business cycles is quite tedious. Here we give an intuitive descrip-
tion and refer the reader to Appendix C for precise formulas. The procedure calculates
the cost of business cycles for the three affected groups: cyclical fragile jobs, permanent-
loss fragile jobs, and timed-entry jobs. The calculation for each group consists of two
steps. First, we calculate the output level associated with this group. That is, we calculate∫ ∫
φpf(φcφp)dφc dφp, where the integration is over the (φcφp) pairs that character-
ize the group. Given this output measure, it is relatively straightforward to calculate the
cost of business cycles. The reason is that the cost of business cycles is a function of just
this output measure and known structural parameters, such as β, ρ, and π. To under-
stand the discussion below, it is important to realize that the cutoff values for φc only
depend on known structural parameter values, but do not depend on the distribution
f (φcφp).
Timed-entry jobs. We first calculate the mass of timed-entry jobs and the associated out-
put level. To identify the mass of timed-entry jobs, we do the following. Timed-entry
jobs have the same output level as those jobs for which the job creation costs are lower
(so that they are not timed-entry jobs). Given our assumption on f (φc|φp) and knowl-
edge of the cutoff levels, we can calculate the mass of timed-entry jobs relative to regular
jobs, that is, jobs that are neither timed-entry nor fragile jobs. Given that they have the
same output level as jobs with lower job creation costs, we can also calculate the output
level associated with timed-entry jobs relative to the output level of jobs with lower job
creation costs.
Cyclical fragile jobs. In the first step, we calculate the output that is earned by cyclical
fragile jobs during a boom. That is, the output associated with the jobs in the loss and
the gain areas in Figure 2. There are two elements in this step. First, from the observed
employment variation along the extensive margin we subtract that part of the calcu-
lated mass of timed-entry jobs that is destroyed during a typical downturn. This gives
the mass of cyclical fragile jobs. Second, using the assumption on the relative produc-
tivity of fragile jobs, we calculate the output that can be produced by cyclical fragile jobs
relative to a measure of aggregate output. This way we obtain a measure for the mass of
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cyclical fragile jobs and their joint output level without having to specify a distribution
for χ. That is, instead of obtaining a direct measure for the mass of cyclical fragile jobs,
we get it indirectly from a measure for observed detrended employment variation and
the calculated mass of timed-entry jobs.
Permanent-loss fragile jobs. Calculating the output that permanent-loss fragile jobs
would produce in a world without business cycles is tricky, since these jobs are not ob-
served in the world we live in, that is, the one with business cycles. We calculate the mass
of these jobs as follows. Above, we showed how to calculate the mass of all cyclical fragile
jobs. Using Assumption 3, we can get a lower bound on the mass of cyclical fragile jobs
with a value of φp that exceeds φ˜pno-bc. Permanent-loss fragile jobs also have a value of
φp that exceeds φ˜pno-bc. Using the assumption on f (φc|φp) and knowledge of the cut-
off levels for φc , we can thus calculate the mass of permanent-loss fragile jobs relative to
regular jobs. As documented in Figure 2, we know that permanent-loss fragile jobs have
the same output level as cyclical fragile jobs with a value of φp that exceeds φ˜pno-bc.
This allows us to calculate the output associated with the permanent-loss fragile jobs
relative to aggregate output.
5. Quantitative impact of business cycles
In Section 5.1, we report and discuss estimates for the cost of business cycles according
to our model. In Section 5.2, we discuss the role of the agency problem and compare the
effort constraint (and the discontinuity it induces) with other types of constraints that
may limit market production.
5.1 Results
Table 2 reports the welfare cost of business cycles. In Lucas (1987), the welfare cost of
business cycles is estimated to be less than 01% of aggregate consumption when agents
are risk averse and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 10.29 By contrast,
the numbers in Table 2 vary from 203% to 127% of aggregate output.
Each block of cells in the table has three rows. The number in the top row reports
the total cost of business cycles as a fraction of total output. The three numbers in the
second row indicate the cost due to permanent-loss fragile jobs, the cost due to cyclical
fragile jobs, and the cost due to timed-entry jobs. The number in the bottom row in-
dicates the entrepreneur’s share of the surplus, ωe, which is set so that the average job
creation cost is equal to the target level.
Consider the four blocks in the top-left corner. These four blocks correspond to the
case when the relative productivity of fragile jobs takes on the low value and average job
creation costs take on the high value. The four blocks differ in what is assumed about
29The costs of business cycles according to the Lucas formula are equal to 05σ2c γ, where σc is the stan-
dard deviation of the cyclical component of aggregate consumption and γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. Thus, if σc is equal to 0013 and γ is equal to 10, then the costs of business cycles are equal to
0084%.
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Table 2. Business cycle costs.
High Average Job Creation Costs Low Average Job Creation Costs
φc = φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) φc < φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) φc = φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) φc < φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
Relative productivity of cyclical jobs equal to 05
φ
c
= 0 313% 318% −000% 192% 203% – 340% 339% −000% 210% 210% –
005% 011% −001% −000%
014 022 002 003
φ
c
= 1/2φ˜∗
cbc 610% 617% −000% 391% 405% – 655% 655% −000% 421% 421% –
007% 014% −000% −000%
012 018 002 002
Relative productivity of cyclical jobs equal to 1
φ
c
= 0 607% 617% −000% 368% 389% – 659% 657% −000% 404% 403% –
010% 021% −002% −001%
014 022 002 003
φ
c
= 1/2φ˜∗
cbc 1184% 1197% −000% 751% 778% – 1271% 1270% −000% 810% 810% –
013% 027% −001% −000%
012 018 002 002
Notes: The number in the first row is the total cost of business cycles as a fraction of GDP. The numbers in the second row are the cost due to permanent-loss fragile jobs, cyclical fragile
jobs, and timed-entry jobs. A dash indicates that there are no timed-entry jobs. A negative number means that business cycles are beneficial. The number in the third row is the value of ωe
needed to get average job creation costs equal to its target value. Also, high (low) average job creation costs corresponds to 1245 (0157) times quarterly output. When φc < φ˜cbc(φpΦ+),
the value of φc is set equal to
1
2 (φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)). This means that the area of permanent-loss fragile jobs is cut in half.
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the lower bound and the upper bound of the distribution of job creation costs φc , and,
thus, differ regarding the importance of permanent-loss fragile and cyclical fragile jobs.
Suppose that the lower bound of the distribution for the job creation cost level, φc ,
is equal to zero and the upper bound is equal to the highest cutoff level for φc , that is,
φ˜c(φpΦ+). The cost of business cycles is then equal to 318%. Only a small part, namely
005%, is due to cyclical fragile jobs. A gain of 061% due to extra jobs being created dur-
ing expansions is roughly offset by a loss of 066% due to some jobs no longer being able
to operate without interruption. Job creation costs are paid more often for these jobs, so
the gain and the loss do not offset. But job creation costs are quantitatively not that im-
portant even at the high end of the estimate for job creation costs. For timed-entry jobs,
there is a gain of 00018%. This consists of a gain of 01189% due to jobs with a value of
φc above φ˜cno-bc(φp) producing in a world with and not producing in a wold without
business cycles, and a loss of 01171% due to jobs with a value of φc below φ˜cno-bc(φp)
delaying entry during downturns. The latter benefits entrepreneurs, but hurts workers.
The 318% cost of business cycles is, thus, almost completely due to permanent-loss
fragile jobs. That is, business cycles are costly, because jobs that are valuable from a
social welfare point of view are no longer created in the presence of business cycles.
The numbers are based on the assumption that the lower bound of the distribution
for φc , φc , is equal to 0, which means that there are jobs that are very cheap to cre-
ate. We also considered a higher value for this lower bound. Increasing the lower bound
increases the cost of business cycles from 318% to 617%. Everything else equal, the
increase in the lower bound of φc cuts the area with cyclical fragile jobs in half. How-
ever, cyclical fragile jobs do not contribute that much to the cost of business cycles. So
how can the cost of business cycles be so sensitive to changes in φ
c
? Key in understand-
ing this result is that we do not keep the distribution f (φcφp) fixed in our calibration
procedure. Instead, we use observed employment fluctuations to pin down the mass of
cyclical fragile jobs. To understand what is going on, suppose that there are no timed-
entry jobs. The change in φ
c
would then have no effect on the mass of cyclical fragile
jobs whatsoever, since the mass of cyclical fragile jobs would remain equal to the ob-
served adjustment in employment along the extensive margin. The reason for the in-
crease in the cost of business cycles is the following. If the same number of cyclical frag-
ile jobs is located in a smaller area of (φcφp) pairs, then this implies that there are more
permanent-loss fragile jobs, since the area of permanent-loss fragile jobs is not affected
by the change in φ
c
. The sensitivity of the results to the value of φ
c
means that φ
c
is a
key parameter. Without having a reliable estimate for this lower bound, it makes sense
to be conservative and to focus on the lowest possible value, that is, φ
c
= 0. But if the
lower bound is higher, then the cost of business cycles could very well be substantially
higher.
So far, we have assumed that the upper bound of the distribution of φc , φc , is equal
to φ˜c(φpΦ+). Recall that the results would be the same if φc would exceed φ˜c(φpΦ+).
We have more confidence in setting φc ≥ φ˜c(φpΦ+) than in setting φc = 0. The reason
is that a lower value for the upper bound implies that there would be no jobs at all that
are too costly to be created, except possibly for fragile jobs. This sounds too good to be
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true. But it is instructive to see what happens if we consider a lower value for φc . A reduc-
tion of φc from φ˜c(φpΦ+) to the alternative lower value cuts the area of permanent-
loss jobs in half. But this does not cut the number of permanent-loss jobs in half for
the following reason. The reduction in φc eliminates all timed-entry jobs. If there are no
timed-entry jobs left, then all observed employment fluctuations must be due to cycli-
cal fragile jobs. A higher mass of cyclical fragile jobs implies a higher mass of cyclical
permanent-loss fragile jobs.30 The cost due to permanent-loss fragile jobs reduces from
313% to 192%, that is, by less than half. Reassigning observed employment fluctuations
from timed-entry jobs to cyclical fragile jobs increases the cost due to cyclical fragile jobs
from 005% to 011%. The disappearance of timed-entry jobs also eliminates the positive
effect of business cycles due to timed-entry jobs. But this is a very small effect.
Sensitivity to average job creation costs. The case considered up to now is based on the
high estimate for job creation costs, namely 1245% of quarterly output. The implied
value for the entrepreneur’s share of the surplus, ωe, ranged from 014 to 022. This is just
the reward for the entrepreneurial activity of creating a job and financing job creation. It
is not a reward for financing capital goods. Thus, the implied values for ωe seem high. If
we consider the low value for the average job creation costs, that is, 0157% of quarterly
output, then the value for ωe drops considerably to values that are at most 00274. Even
though the change in the average job creation costs and the change in the value of ωe are
substantial, the implied cost of business cycles varies relatively little. For example, when
φ
c
= 0 and φc = φ˜c(φpΦ+), then the cost of business cycles increases from 318% to
339%. In Figure 2, a reduction of ωe would induce a proportional shift of all the cutoff
levels for φc . Moreover, given our calibration procedure, the mass in the relevant areas
remains the same. The reason that the cost of business cycles increases is that the cost of
job creation relative to the level of output has gone down. This matters for the following
reasons. An offsetting benefit of business cycles for permanent-loss fragile jobs is that
these jobs no longer have to pay job creation costs. This benefit is smaller when job
creation costs are smaller. By contrast, for cyclical fragile jobs, the reduction in the cost of
job creation costs reduces the cost of business cycles, because these jobs pay job creation
costs more often in the presence of business cycles. The first effect clearly dominates.31
Efficient job creation. Recall that job creation is efficient when ωe = 1, that is, when the
entrepreneur has all the bargaining power. At this value for ωe, average job creation costs
are at least 57 times quarterly output, which is implausible. Nevertheless, it is interest-
ing to see whether business cycles are costly if job creation is efficient. They clearly are.
For example, when φ
c
= 0 and φc = φ˜c(φpΦ+), then the total cost of business cycles
is equal to 171% of GDP. The division across the three groups, relative to the results re-
ported above for lower ωe values, is a bit different. The cost endured by cyclical fragile
30In our calibration procedure, if there are more fragile jobs with a value of φc below φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), then
there must be more fragile jobs with a value of φc above φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), conditional on the value of φp.
31At the low value for the average job creation costs considered, the gains of cyclical fragile jobs that
start producing during booms is virtually equal to the losses of the cyclical fragile jobs that stop producing
during recessions. That is, job creation costs have become so low that the actual payment do not play much
of a role anymore. They still matter because they affect the entrepreneur’s decision to create jobs.
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jobs is now equal to 046%. Thus, the relative importance of cyclical jobs for the total cost
of business cycles has increased. The reason is that business cycles induce these jobs to
pay job creation costs more often and this negative effect is costlier when job creation
costs are higher. When the job creation decision is efficient, then timed-entry jobs are
marginal jobs from a social welfare point of view. Consequently, a bit more or a bit less
entry has even less of an impact than when job creation is not efficient.32 In particular,
the gain of business cycles due to timed-entry jobs is now 00010%. With inefficient en-
try the numbers are roughly 100 times larger, but go in opposite directions, that is. a gain
for timed-entry jobs above the no-business-cycles cutoff level and a loss for timed-entry
jobs below this cutoff. The net result is then similar to the net result with efficient entry.
More productive fragile jobs. The numbers above are based on the assumption that frag-
ile jobs are only half as productive as other jobs. Fragile jobs are an important part of em-
ployment fluctuations over the business cycle. Consequently, the Solow residual could
be acyclical or even countercyclical, because the jobs created during booms are less pro-
ductive than the other jobs. As an alternative, we consider the (extreme) case when frag-
ile jobs are as productive as other jobs. This means that fragility is no longer due to a job
having a low value for φp, but is due to having a high value for χ.
The results are reported in the lower half of Table 2. Not surprisingly, the cost of busi-
ness cycles are now much higher, roughly twice as high. This is solely due to increased
cost of business cycles for permanent-loss fragile and for cyclical fragile jobs, since the
cost for timed-entry jobs is not affected by this change.
Higher unemployment benefits. Finally, we consider an increase in the value of unem-
ployment from 20% to 43% of market output. Recall that the value of unemployment
only includes the benefits from a social welfare point of view and excludes transfers.
Consequently, 43% is a substantial number. Not surprisingly, this increase lowers the
cost of business cycles. But the costs of business cycles remain substantial. For the same
cases considered in Table 2, the cost of business cycles varies between 141% and 796%.
Cost of business cycles for individuals. Since we assume that agents are risk neutral, busi-
ness cycles only affect the wellbeing of an individual if this individual’s decisions are
affected. This is a relatively small group. Regarding jobs that produce in the world we
live in, that is, the one with business cycles, this is limited to jobs that are part of the
observed employment adjustment over the business cycle along the extensive margin.
Regarding jobs that do not produce in the world we live in, that is, permanent-loss frag-
ile jobs, this is still a relatively small group because the importance of this group is linked
to the importance of cyclical fragile jobs.
Given that only a relatively small group of individuals is affected by business cycles,
the cost of business cycles can only be substantial if the consequences for affected indi-
viduals are sizeable.
32Recall that with efficient entry, the gain of business cycles due to timed-entry jobs goes to zero as the
magnitude of business cycles approaches zero.
324 Den Haan and Sedlacek Quantitative Economics 5 (2014)
Table 3. Individual costs.
High Average Job Creation Costs Low Average Job Creation Costs
φc = φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) φc < φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) φc = φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) φc < φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
= 0 7291% 7204% 7911% 7900%
−3769% 4078% −3609% 4151% −4015% 3966% −3994% 3975%
925% −5965% – – 1056% −6804% – –
φ
c
= 1/2φ˜∗
cbc 7377% 7345% 7921% 7917%
−3680% 4119% −3506% 4198% −4003% 3971% −3981% 3981%
943% −6081% – – 1058% −6819% – –
Notes: This table reports the cost of business cycles for individual jobs as a fraction of individual output, φp . A negative
number means that business cycles are beneficial. The number in the first row gives the cost of business cycles for permanent-
loss fragile jobs averaged across all jobs in this category. The numbers in the second row give the average cost of business cycles
for cyclical fragile jobs that gain, that is, jobs for which φ˜pbc(Φ+) < φp < φ˜pno-bc, and the average cost for jobs that lose, that
is, jobs for which φ˜pno-bc ≤φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−). The number in the third row gives the average cost of business cycles for timed-
entry jobs when φ˜cbc(φpΦ−) < φc ≤ φcno-bc(φp) and the average cost when φcno-bc(φp) < φc ≤ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+). Also,
high (low) average job creation costs corresponds to 1245 (0157) times quarterly output. When φc < φ˜cbc(φpΦ+), the value
of φc is set equal to
1
2 (φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)). This means that the area of permanent-loss fragile jobs is cut in half.
This is made precise in Table 3, which reports the individual cost of business cycles
for the different affected groups. Each block of cells has three rows. The number in the
first row is the individual cost of business cycles averaged across the permanent-loss
fragile jobs. The two numbers in the second row are the average individual costs for
cyclical fragile jobs with a value of φp below and above χ, that is, for the jobs that gain
and lose compared to the world with no business cycles. The two numbers in the third
row are the average individual costs for timed-entry jobs with a value of φc below and
above φ˜cno-bc(φp).
To understand the numbers, consider a hypothetical job for which job creation costs
are zero and that always produces in a world without business cycles, but never in a
world with business cycles. Since the value of not producing market production is equal
to 20% of market production, the cost of business cycles as a fraction of market pro-
duction would be equal to 80% for this hypothetical job. Being completely driven out
of business by business cycles only happens for permanent-loss fragile jobs. These jobs
have nonzero job creation costs and an offsetting benefit of business cycles is that these
job creation costs do not have to be paid. Consequently, 80% is an upper bound for the
cost of business cycles. Similarly, 80% is an upper bound for the gain of a timed-entry
job that is created during booms in a world with business cycles and is never created in a
world without business cycles. The productivity of fragile jobs relative to other jobs does
not matter for the individual cost of business cycles, since this cost is calculated relative
to the individual’s own productivity.
Consider the block of cells in the top-left corner. This corresponds to the case with
the high average job creation costs. Moreover, φ
c
= 0 and φc = φ˜cbc(φpΦ+). The ta-
ble shows that the results are similar for alternative values. The cost of business cycles
for permanent-loss fragile jobs is on average equal to 729% of market production. Not
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having to pay job creation costs pulls the cost a bit below the worst case scenario of a
loss of 80%, but not by much. Cyclical fragile jobs that start producing during booms
in a world with business cycles gain on average 377% and cyclical fragile jobs that can
no longer produce during recessions in a world with business cycles incur on average a
loss of 408%. Timed-entry jobs for which entry is delayed during recessions in a world
with business cycles face a cost of business cycles equal to 925%. Part of the net cost is
a very small gain for the entrepreneur for whom the option to postpone entry is benefi-
cial. Timed-entry jobs that are created during booms in a world with business cycles but
are never created in a world without business cycles face a gain of business cycles equal
to 597%. The gain for jobs with a value of φc above φ˜cno-bc(φp) exceeds the loss for
jobs with a value of φc above φ˜cno-bc(φp) since workers gain much more from becom-
ing employed during expansions (and remaining employed until exogenous severance)
than they lose from delayed hiring during recessions.33
5.2 The role of the agency problem
The agency problem creates a discontinuity in the revenues produced by agents. That is,
a small change in the value of φpΦpt can create a much bigger drop in revenues, namely
from a value equal to or above χ to a value equal to μ. This discontinuity is essential in
generating the nontrivial cost of business cycles. The reason is the following.
Fluctuations in Φpt are small, which makes it difficult for business cycles to matter
quantitatively. In our model, fluctuations in Φpt only affect agents if changes in Φpt af-
fect employment adjustment along the extensive margin. In our calibration procedure,
the extent to which fluctuations in Φpt affect the extensive margin is constrained by ob-
served changes in employment along the extensive margin. This is a nontrivial number,
but still only a very small part of the population. Even though business cycles do not
affect many agents in our model, they are costly because the agents who are affected are
affected a lot.34
In our experience, the following alternative models have turned out to be helpful
in making clear the tight link in our model between facing an agency problem and the
discontinuity, and, thus, the role of the agency problem in generating the large cost of
business cycles. Before starting the discussion, the reader is reminded that the agency
problem by itself does not cause business cycles to be costly. Over the business cycle, the
agency problem has a discontinuous negative effect if Φpt falls, but also has a discon-
tinuous positive effects if Φpt increases. For business cycles to be costly, we also need
job creation costs to be positive.
33There are, however, more timed-entry jobs below than above φ˜cno-bc(φp), which means that the con-
sequences of business cycles for the two types of timed-entry jobs aggregated are closer to each other in
absolute magnitude.
34Another (but related) way to think about this is the following. The cutoff levels are continuous functions
of Φpt . Consequently, small changes in Φpt will not affect a lot of jobs unless the distribution is such that
there is a high concentration of jobs exactly around the cutoff levels.
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5.2.1 Model with only a participation constraint Suppose that there is no effort con-
straint.35 There still would be a participation constraint, since the worker would need to
get at least μ. Thus, the effort constraint of equation (6) is replaced by
φpΦpt ≥ μ (13)
For simplicity, we focus on the case with efficient job creation. Business cycles turn out
to be beneficial for the following reason. In a world with business cycles, the job creation
and the continuation decisions could be identical to those in a world without business
cycles. The reason is that equation (13) is not a feasibility constraint, like the effort con-
straint, but an optimality condition. If the decisions could be the same, then the rev-
enues would be more volatile in a world with business cycles, but—given our assump-
tion of risk neutrality—this would not affect utility levels. Consequently, business cycles
cannot make agents worse off. In fact, business cycles would be welfare enhancing.
The reader may find the discussion surprising, because the participation constraint
given by equation (13) seems to be identical to the effort constraint of equation (6). The
difference lies in what is being earned if the relevant constraint is not satisfied. Consider
a job with a value of φp that is exactly at the cutoff level in a world without business cy-
cles, that is, φp = φ˜pno-bc = μ. The equations are simpler for this particular job, but the
argument carries over to all fragile jobs. Expected revenues in a world without business
cycles, Rno-bc, and expected revenues in a world with business cycles, Rbc, are given by
Rno-bc = μ
(14)
Rbc =E
[
max{μμΦpt}
]= μE[max{1Φpt}]
Clearly, Rbc > Rno-bc when ΔΦp > 0, since max{1Φpt} is a convex function. Moreover,
increased volatility in Φpt would increase the value of Rbc. That is, without the agency
problem, the unemployment benefit works like a put option and increased uncertainty
raises the expected payoff. If effort constraint (6) holds instead, then expected revenues
are given by
Rno-bc = χ
(15)
Rbc = 12μ+
1
2
χΦ+
We have Rno-bc >Rbc unless the values of μ and χ are close to each other.36 Business cy-
cles in the presence of the agency problem thus creates an unavoidable drop in revenues
because μ < χ. This makes the problem very different from the one with the participa-
tion constraint as in equation (13).
35In Den Haan and Sedlacek (2009), we described in detail the model without the effort constraint.
36The precise parameter restriction we use is given in Assumption 2.
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5.2.2 Adjustment costs Suppose that output is given by φpΦptnt , where nt is a flex-
ible labor input. In addition, suppose that output net of adjustment costs is given by
φpΦptn
α
t − ζ(nt − nt−1)2. One might think that business cycles are costly if ζ is high, so
that a model with a high value for ζ would mimic the discontinuous payoff structure in
our model. But note that firms can avoid the high adjustment costs by simply not adjust-
ing nt . This would imply that the actual employment is not equal to the optimal level of
employment. But for realistic movements in Φpt , such deviations cannot be very large.
Now suppose that there is a cost when the level of output is adjusted. In particu-
lar, suppose that output net of adjustment costs is given by φpΦptnαt − ζ(φpΦptnαt −
φpn
α
no-bc)
2. If the firm cannot adjust nt , then business cycles could be costly, but only
if ζ is very high, since fluctuations in Φpt are small. In this case, the firm is forced to
vary the output level even though it is costly. The question arises as to why small fluctu-
ations in output would correspond with high adjustment cost. Moreover, the cost could
be avoided if the firm can adjust the value of nt . In this case, the firm can avoid the
adjustment costs in output by adjusting nt such that φpΦptnt remains constant. Since
fluctuations in Φpt are small, this would not require large changes in nt .
5.2.3 Minimum-output requirement Consider a model in which firms have to keep
output above a certain minimum level, ζ, for example, because of regulation or because
it is too expensive to reduce capacity. Again, suppose that firm-level output is given by
φpΦptnt . Firms can ensure that output exceeds ζ by adjusting nt . Also suppose that
μ < ζ. This setup in which firm output has to exceed ζ seems to be similar to the setup
with the agency problem in which firms can only operate if their output exceeds χ. In
fact, it is quite different. Let n∗(Φ−) be the optimal level of n if there is no minimum-
output requirement. Consider jobs such that φpΦ−n∗(Φ−) < ζ. The difference with the
agency problem is that these jobs are not necessarily discontinued and, thus, do not
necessarily face a discontinuous drop in revenues down to μ. The reason is that the op-
tion exists to increase n above n∗(Φ−) so that the minimum-output requirement is still
satisfied. If φpΦpt does not change very much, then the adjustment in nt needed to
satisfy the minimum-output requirement cannot be very costly. Consequently, business
cycles cannot be very costly.
5.2.4 Avoiding the agency problem The idea behind an agency problem is that adjust-
ment to avoid the agency problem is not possible. Of course, faced with a discontin-
uous drop in income after a job destruction, agents would have an incentive to try to
avoid the agency problem.37 In our environment in which only the entrepreneur faces
an effort constraint, the entrepreneur could avoid the agency problem by accumulating
enough funds. She can then pay the worker in advance so that the decision to put in low
effort would no longer affect participation by the worker. But this would not alleviate
the agency problem if the worker also has the option to put in low effort, as is the case
37This is a standard aspect of models with agency problems. For example, in models in which an agency
problem affects firm financing, there is an incentive for the firm owner to accumulate so much wealth that
the agency problem affecting outside financing is no longer relevant. To insure that the agency problem
remains relevant, there must be something that goes against this incentive. This could be a tax advantage
of debt or impatient entrepreneurs.
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in the original contractual fragility framework of Ramey and Watson (1997).38 Creative
readers may think of other ways to avoid the agency problem, but the premise of this
paper is that agency problems are important for business cycle analysis for one reason
or another. This paper shows that if this is the case and job creation costs are positive,
then business cycles are costly.
6. Related literature
Following the classic Lucas (1987) paper, there have been numerous attempts to develop
models in which business cycles are costly.39 One strand of the literature considers pref-
erences in which fluctuations are more harmful to the agent.40 A second strand of the
literature considers the possibility that risk is not spread evenly across agents. When id-
iosyncratic risk is persistent, then this line of research generates estimates for the cost
of business cycles that are an order of magnitude larger than those found by Lucas.41
The idea is that unemployment has very negative consequences for the individual and
is a relatively rare event. Business cycles can be costly if risk sharing among agents is
sufficiently limited and the agents’ degree of risk aversion is high enough.
Lucas’ calculations on the cost of business cycles are based on a comparison be-
tween two economies: one with and one without business cycles, but both have the
same long-run growth path. But the presence of business cycles could very well have
long-term level or even growth effects. Empirical evidence for this view can be found in
Ramey and Ramey (1995), Martin and Rogers (2000), Loayza, Ranciere, Serven, and Ven-
tura (2007), Burnside and Tabova (2009), and Den Haan and Sedlacek (2009).42 Although
the relationship seems stronger for low and middle income countries, the link also exists
for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Our paper is related to a set of papers that build theoretical models in which fluctu-
ations have such level or growth effects. As shown in Ramey and Ramey (1991), Jones,
Manuelli, and Stacchetti (2000), Epaulard and Pommeret (2003), and Barlevy (2004),
there is a relationship between growth and volatility in endogenous growth models.
Barlevy (2004) pointed out that for a reduction in volatility to have a quantitatively im-
portant effect on output, it is important that the increase in investment induced by
a reduction in volatility not only increases the growth rate of consumption, but also
does not lead to an initial reduction in the level of consumption.43  Barlevy (2004) ac-
complished this by introducing diminishing returns to investment into an endogenous
38It also requires that the entrepreneur and the owner of the firm are the same person.
39See Lucas (2003) for a summary.
40Examples of this line of research are Alvarez and Jermann (2005) and Tallarini (2000).
41See Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001), Krebs (2007), Santis (2007), and Krusell, Mukoyama, Sahin,
and Smith (2009).
42These papers establish an unconditional negative correlation between business cycles and real activ-
ity. There are also channels that generate a positive correlation. For example, Levchenko, Ranciere, and
Thoenig (2009) showed that financial liberalization leads to an increase in both volatility and expected eco-
nomic growth.
43Mertens (2008) showed how fluctuations can affect the average level of investment in a model without
endogenous growth. In his model, agents have distorted beliefs and fluctuations worsen this distortion.
Consequently, the risk premium is higher and the average capital stock is lower in a world with business
cycles.
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growth model. The nonlinearity makes it possible for a reduction in fluctuations to have
a positive effect on the growth rate, even if average investment levels, and thus the initial
consumption level, are not affected by fluctuations.
Such a nonlinearity is also important in papers that show that volatility has a nega-
tive effect on the average level of real activity. Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2007) con-
sidered a simple New-Keynesian model in which the efficiency losses due to mispricing
in a recession are not offset by the efficiency gains in a boom. Business cycles are then
welfare reducing, although the effects turn out to be small. Jung and Kuester (2011) and
Hairault, Langot, and Osotimehin (2010) showed that the matching model contains a
nonlinearity that causes volatility in job finding rates to reduce average unemployment.
In particular, increases in job finding rates during booms have less of an impact than de-
creases in job finding rates during recessions, because the unemployment rate is smaller
during booms than recessions.
How does our explanation compare with those given in these papers? Our main
mechanism is not that expansions and contractions have asymmetric/nonlinear effects
on the job creation decision or on the agency problem. That is, if we would add a third
middle state to our model in which Φp is equal to Φ0 ≡ 12(Φ+ +Φ−), then there is no ro-
bust reason for asymmetric effects if Φp increases from Φ0 to Φ+ or decreases from Φ0
to Φ−.44 That is, a boom is still pretty much the opposite of a recession. In our model,
the interaction between job creation costs and the agency problem permanently elimi-
nates some jobs in the presence of business cycles. Business cycles have a negative level
effect, but are themselves not asymmetric.
7. Robustness and concluding comments
In this paper, we have presented a model in which business cycles are costly, because
they affect the average level of output. In developing the model, we had to make sev-
eral choices about, for example, the particular agency problem agents face. In this last
section, we contend that the mechanism highlighted in this paper is robust to changing
many of the particular choices made.
We adopted the contractual fragility framework of Ramey and Watson (1997). The
relevant aspects are the following. First, the relationship has to generate enough re-
sources to overcome the agency problem. Second, if the relationship does not overcome
the agency problem, then it breaks up and the resources generated are substantially less
than if it could have continued. These two features are common to many other agency
problems. In Appendix A.2 of Den Haan and Sedlacek (2009), we worked out the case
in which firm financing is hampered by an agency problem. The implications are very
similar.
In our model, business cycles make some jobs temporarily or permanently impossi-
ble, which is costly since these jobs have a positive surplus from a social welfare point of
view. But the exclusive focus on the extensive employment margin may underestimate
the cost of business cycles. Business cycles have no welfare consequences for jobs that
are not temporarily or permanently eliminated. But the mechanism highlighted in this
44The model could generate asymmetries if the mass of projects is distributed in an asymmetric manner.
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paper may be relevant for these jobs as well. This would be the case if existing jobs have
the possibility to make investments to increase the job’s productivity. The cost of these
investments would be like the job creation cost. Combined with an agency problem (say
a holdup problem) that is associated with the extra revenues, then we have the same
features used in our job creation framework.
We assumed that idiosyncratic differences are permanent. This simplifies the analy-
sis enormously. But we do not think that it matters for the mechanism. What matters is
that there always are jobs that belong to the critical regions. If there are jobs in these re-
gions, then business cycles lower the average level of output. It does not matter whether
the jobs and the workers in these regions are always the same ones or whether they can
be different ones as time passes.
In our model, the distribution for φc and φp is taken as exogenous, but the results
could be affected if agents can affect their own productivity and/or level of job creation
costs. This may be the case if workers and entrepreneurs affected by business cycles
could put in search or another type of effort to get different values for φc and/or φp.
But business cycles would remain costly as long as it is not that easy to make marginal
workers more productive or to reduce job creation costs.
We end the paper with the following observation. Our numerical work focuses on
the cost of business cycles, but our time-varying shock, Φpt , does not have to be an ag-
gregate shock. It also could be a sectoral, geographical, or an idiosyncratic shock. These
fluctuations are likely to be larger than business cycle fluctuations. If the cost of business
cycles is already nontrivial, then the welfare consequences of these other fluctuations
could very well be a staggering number.
Appendix A: Formulas and additional results
In this appendix, we do the following. First, we give the formulas that determine the
cutoff levels. Second, we give the expressions for the welfare cost of business cycles for
individual jobs for generic values for ΔΦp . Third, we show that among affected jobs, the
jobs at the cutoff levels are affected the least (the most) for those jobs that are negatively
(positively) affected by business cycles. Proofs are given in Appendix B.
A.1 Timed-entry jobs
Cutoff levels for timed-entry jobs, φ˜cbc(φpΦpt). Recall that Nbc(φcφp1Φpt) and
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt) stand for the NPVs of a job with job creation cost φc , productivity
φp, and aggregate productivity Φpt when the job creation cost has and has not been
paid, respectively. The value of φ˜cbc(φpΦ−) satisfies the condition that during a re-
cession, the entrepreneur is indifferent between waiting until Φp = Φ+ and immediate
entry. That is, it can be solved from the system
Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−
)
= μ+β[πNbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−) (16a)
+ (1−π)Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ+
)]

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Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−
)
= −φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)+φpΦ−
+β[πρ(Nbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−)+ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−))
(16b)
+π(1− ρ)Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−
)
+ (1−π)ρ(Nbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ+)+ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−))
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ+
)]

Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ+
)
= −φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)+φpΦ+
+β[πρ(Nbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ+)+ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−))
(16c)
+π(1− ρ)Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ+
)
+ (1−π)ρ(Nbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−)+ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−))
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φ−
)]

These equations use that
Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp1Φpt
)
=Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)φp0Φpt
)+ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
that is, waiting does not create any additional value at φc = φ˜cbc(φpΦ−) in both ag-
gregate states. The first equation specifies the benefits of waiting with job creation; the
second equation specifies the benefits of immediate creation. The last equation defines
the additional term that shows up in the first two equations. Recall that next period,
the aggregate state stays the same with probability π and the job faces an exogenous
destruction shock with probability 1− ρ.
The cutoff value in a boom, φ˜cbc(φpΦ+), can be solved from the condition that the
entrepreneur is indifferent between creating and not creating the project:
μ
1−β = −φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+φpΦ+
+β
[
πρ
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+ μ1−β
)
+π(1− ρ)× μ
1−β (17a)
+ (1−π)ρNbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)φp1Φ−
)+ (1−π)(1− ρ)× μ
1−β
]

Nbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)φp1Φ−
)
=φpΦ−
(17b)
+β
[
πρNbc
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)φp1Φ−
)+π(1− ρ)× μ
1−β
+ (1−π)ρ
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+ μ1−β
)
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)× μ
1−β
]

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The first equation equates the benefits of not creating the job to the benefits of creat-
ing the job. The second equation defines the additional term that shows up in the first
equation.
NPVs of timed-entry jobs. The NPVs Nbc(φcφp0Φ+), Nbc(φcφp1Φ+), Nbc(φcφp
0Φ−), and Nbc(φcφp1Φ−) are solved from the system of equations
Nbc(φcφp0Φ+)
= −φc +φpΦ+
(18)
+β(πρNbc(φcφp1Φ+)+π(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp0Φ+)
+ (1−π)ρNbc(φcφp1Φ−)+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp0Φ−)
)

Nbc(φcφp1Φ+)=Nbc(φcφp0Φ+)+φc (19)
Nbc(φcφp0Φ−)
(20)
= μ+β(πNbc(φcφp0Φ−)+ (1−π)Nbc(φcφp0Φ+))
Nbc(φcφp1Φ−)
=φpΦ−
(21)
+β(πρNbc(φcφp1Φ−)+π(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp0Φ−)
+ (1−π)ρNbc(φcφp1Φ+)+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp0Φ+)
)

Most affected timed-entry jobs. For timed-entry jobs, it holds that
L(φ˜cno-bcφpΔΦp) < L(φcφpΔΦp)≤ 0 for φc = φ˜cno-bc(φp) (22)
If job creation is efficient, then timed-entry jobs benefit from business cycles. Thus, the
inequality means that jobs at the cutoff benefit the most. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. Jobs that have a value ofφc such that φ˜cno-bc(φp) < φc < φ˜c(φpΦ+) benefit from
business cycles because the higher value of Φpt during a boom makes entry worthwhile.
The higher is the value of φc , the lower is the value of this benefit. Jobs with a value of φc
such that φ˜c(φpΦ−) < φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp) benefit from business cycles since they create
value by postponing job creation during a recession. The lower is the value of φc , the
lower is the benefit of paying φc in the future.
Timed-entry jobs when ωe < 1. When ωe < 1, then the formulas for Nbc(·) stay the same,
but it is no longer the case that Nebc(·) = Nbc(·). Consequently, the cutoff levels ad-
just. To get the formulas for this case, in equations (16a)–(16c) and (17a)–(17b) simply
(i) replace μ (i.e., what the relationship can produce when not producing market pro-
duction) with 0 (which is what the entrepreneur produces outside the relationship) and
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(ii) replace φpΦpt (i.e., what the relationship can produce) with ωe(φpΦpt − μ) (i.e.,
what the entrepreneur gets).
A.2 Fragile jobs
The following proposition gives cutoff levels and the cost of business cycles for fragile
jobs.
Proposition 3. Suppose that (a) Assumption 2 is satisfied and (b) ωe = 1. Then the fol-
lowing properties hold.
(i) Cutoff levels for fragile jobs.45 The cutoff level for φc if there are no business cycles
is equal to
φ˜cno-bc(φp)=
φp −μ
1−βρ if φp ≥ φ˜pno-bc (23)
The cutoff level for φc if there are business cycles is
φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)=
φp(1+ΔΦp)−μ
1−βρπ if φ˜pbc(Φ+)≤φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−) (24)
Jobs that do not satisfy the effort constraint during recessions but do so in a world without
business cycles have a lower cutoff level for φc in a world with than in a world without
business cycles. That is,
φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+) < φ˜cno-bc(φp) if φ˜pno-bc ≤φp < φ˜pbc(Φ+) (25)
Moreover, this gap does not approach zero as business cycles become arbitrarily small:
lim
ΔΦp→0
φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)=
φp −μ
1−βρπ < φ˜cno-bc(φp)=
φp −μ
1−βρ  (26)
(ii) Welfare impact for fragile jobs, ΔΦp  0. If ΔΦp > 0, then the change in welfare for
weak-inequality jobs with φp = φ˜pno-bc and fragile jobs with φp > φ˜pno-bc is given by
L(φcφpΔΦp)
(27)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1−ΔΦp − μˆ
2
+ φc
φp
(
1−βρπ − 2(1−βρ)
2
)
> 0
if 0≤φc < φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)
1− (1−βρ) φc
φp
− μˆ > 0 if φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)≤φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)
0 if φc ≥ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
45Jobs with φp < φ˜pno-bc are not created, because they never satisfy the effort contraint in a world with-
out business cycles.
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where μˆ= μ/φp. The change in welfare for strict-inequality jobs with φp = φ˜pno-bc and
fragile jobs with φp < φ˜pno-bc is given by
L(φcφpΔΦp)
(28)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μˆ− (1+ΔΦp)
2
+ φc
φp
(
1−βρπ
2
)
< 0
if 0≤φc < φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)
0 if φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)≤φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)
0 if φc ≥ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
Business cycles are beneficial for strict-inequality jobs and costly for weak-inequality jobs.
To study the net effect on a strict-inequality and a weak-inequality job with the same
values for φp and φc , we calculate the total effect. The total welfare loss for this pair at
φp = φ˜pno-bc is given by46
L(φcφpΔΦp)
(29)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
−ΔΦp +
φc
φp
βρ(1−π)
)
< 0 if 0≤φc <
φpΔΦp
βρ(1−π)(
−ΔΦp +
φc
φp
βρ(1−π)
)
= 0 if φc =
φpΔΦp
βρ(1−π)(
−ΔΦp +
φc
φp
βρ(1−π)
)
> 0 if
φpΔΦp
βρ(1−π) <φc < φ˜
∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
1− (1−βρ) φc
φp
− μˆ > 0 if φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)≤φc < φ˜cno-bc(φp)
0 if φc ≥ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
Least affected fragile jobs. Among fragile jobs, the cost of business cycles are smallest
at the cutoff value, that is, when φp = φ˜pno-bc. That is, for fragile jobs the following
inequality holds:
L(φc φ˜pno-bcΔΦp) < L(φcφpΔΦp) for φp = φ˜pno-bc (30)
For fragile jobs, the cost (gain) of business cycles is, thus, smallest (largest) for the
jobs considered in the previous section. First, consider jobs with φp < φ˜pno-bc and
φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+). The entry cost of these jobs is low enough so that entry is prof-
itable even though they only survive until the next recession. In a world with business
cycles, these jobs generate output equal to (1+ ΔΦp)φp > μ during a boom and μ dur-
ing a recession, whereas they always generate μ in a world without business cycles. The
larger is the value of φp, the larger are the gains (for equal values of φc). Thus, the wel-
fare gain attained by strict-inequality jobs with φp = φ˜pno-bc is an upper bound for the
gains achieved by fragile jobs with φp < φ˜pno-bc.
46If φc ≤ φ∗cbc(φpΦ+), this is the sum of the weak-inequality and the strict-inequality job. If φc ≤
φ∗
cbc(φpΦ+) < φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp), this is just equal to the effect of the weak-inequality job, since the strict-
inequality job is not affected by business cycles.
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Next, consider fragile jobs with φp ≥ φ˜pno-bc. In this case, the welfare loss at-
tained by weak-inequality jobs with φp = φ˜pno-bc are a lower bound for the losses suf-
fered. Business cycles permanently reduce the market output of fragile jobs when φc
is above φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+) and temporarily (namely during recessions) when φc is below
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+). Consequently, the loss is larger when the value of φp is larger (for equal
values of φc).
Fragile jobs when ωe < 1. If ωe < 1, then the formulas have to be adjusted in the same
way as they were adjusted above for timed-entry jobs.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. This proposition focuses on jobs that can always overcome
the efficiency condition and have a value of φc that is exactly at the boundary. Thus,
φc = φ˜cno-bc(φp) and φp > φ˜pbc(Φ−) (31)
In a world without business cycles, the value of activating a job with φc = φ˜cno-bc would
be equal to the value of not activating. Thus,
Nno-bc(φcφp0)= μ1−β if φc = φ˜cno-bc(φp) and φp > φ˜pbc(Φ−) (32)
In a world with business cycles, jobs with φc = φ˜cno-bc and φp > φ˜pbc(Φ−) are timed-
entry jobs. Timed-entry jobs are only created during expansions, but an already acti-
vated job continues to operate in a recession. The NPVs for timed-entry jobs are given
by
Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)
= −φc +φp(1+ΔΦp)
+β(πρNbc(φcφp11+ΔΦp) (33)
+π(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+ (1−π)ρNbc(φcφp11−ΔΦp)
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
)

Nbc(φcφp11+ΔΦp)=Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+φc (34)
Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
(35)
= μ+β(πNbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)+ (1−π)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp))
Nbc(φcφp11−ΔΦp)
=φp(1−ΔΦp)
+β(πρNbc(φcφp11−ΔΦp) (36)
+π(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)+ (1−π)ρNbc(φcφp11+ΔΦp)
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)
)

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Let
D(φcφp)=Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)−Nbc(φcφp11−ΔΦp)+φc (37)
Then
E
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)
]
= Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
2
(38)
= −(1−βρ)φc +φp(1+ΔΦp)+μ−βρ(1−π)D(φcφp)
2(1−β) 
For these jobs, the cutoff level for φc is given by
φ˜cno-bc =
φp −μ
1−βρ  (39)
Using this last expression, we get that
E
[
Nbc(φ˜cno-bcφp0Φpt)
]= φpΔΦp + 2μ−βρ(1−π)D(φcφp)
2(1−β)  (40)
The expression for D is calculated as follows. Working out the terms in the definition of
D, we get
D(φcφp) = φc +Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)−Nbc(φcφp11−ΔΦp) (41)
= φc +μ
+β(πNbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)+ (1−π)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp))
−
(
φp(1−ΔΦp)+β
(
πρNbc(φcφp11−ΔΦp)
+π(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
+ (1−π)ρNbc(φcφp11+ΔΦp)
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)
))
= φc +μ
+β(πNbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)+ (1−π)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp))
−
(
φp(1−ΔΦp)+β
(
π
(
Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)+ ρ(φc −D)
)
+ (1−π)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+ ρφc
))
= φc(1−βρ)+μ−φp(1−ΔΦp)+βπρD (42)
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From this, we get
D(φcφp)=
φc(1−βρ)+μ−φp(1−ΔΦp)
1−βπρ  (43)
Moreover,
D(φcφp)=
φpΔΦp
1−βπρ if φc = φ˜cno-bc =
φp −μ
1−βρ  (44)
If we combine this expression for D(φcφp) with the expression in equation (40) and
the definition of the welfare loss, then we get that
L(φcφpΔΦp) =
(1−β)
φp
(
μ
1−β −
φpΔΦp + 2μ−βρ(1−π)D(φcφp)
2(1−β)
)
(45)
= −ΔΦp(1−βρ)
2(1−βπρ)  
Proof of Proposition 2. The expressions for the case with ΔΦp > 0 are given in
Proposition 3. The results follow directly by letting ΔΦp approach 0. 
Proof of part (i) of Proposition 3. The term φ˜cno-bc(φp) is defined as the value
of φc at which the value of creating the job is equal to the value of never activating the
job.47 Thus,
Nno-bc(φ˜cno-bcφp1)− φ˜cno-bc = μ1−β (46)
The value of a created job is given by
Nno-bc(φcφp1)
(47)
=φp +βρNno-bc(φcφp1)+β(1− ρ)Nno-bc(φcφp0)
If Assumption 2 is satisfied, then activating a job is profitable if the effort constraint is
satisfied and the job creation costs are low enough. Thus,
Nno-bc(φcφp1)=Nno-bc(φcφp0)+φc when
{
φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc and
φp ≥ φ˜pno-bc
(48)
Combining the last three equations gives
φ˜cno-bc(φp)=
φp −μ
1−βρ if φp ≥ φ˜pno-bc (49)
Next, we calculate the value of φ˜∗
cbc(φp), that is, the cutoff level for fragile jobs. If
the job creation costs are low enough, then these jobs are created in a boom, but not in
47To economize on notation, we typically write φ˜cno-bc instead of φ˜cno-bc(φp).
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a recession.48 Thus, if φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), then
Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)
= −φc +φp(1+ΔΦp)
+β
(
πρ
(
Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+φc
)
(50)
+π(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+ (1−π)ρNbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
+ (1−π)(1− ρ)Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
)

By definition, φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+) is the value of φc such that
Nbc
(
φ˜∗cbcφp01+ΔΦp
)= μ
1−β (51)
In a boom, this type of job could either produce or not produce. The NPV would be equal
to μ/(1 − β) for both choices. In a recession, this job cannot produce, so the revenues
are equal to μ until the economy gets out of a recession, at which point the NPV by
definition is equal to μ/(1−β). Consequently,
Nbc
(
φ˜∗cbcφp01−ΔΦp
)= μ
1−β (52)
Combining the last equations gives
φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)=
φp(1+ΔΦp)−μ
1−βρπ  (53)
Assumption 2 directly implies that
φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+) < φ˜cno-bc(φp) if φ˜pno-bc ≤φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−) (54)

Proof of part (ii) of Proposition 3. To calculate the formulas in this part of the
proposition, we have to first calculate the relevant NPVs. First consider a world without
business cycles. If the job cannot satisfy the effort constraint or if the job creation costs
are too high, then the job is never created and the revenues are μ each period. Thus
Nno-bc(φcφp0)= μ1−β if φp < φ˜pno-bc or φc > φ˜cno-bc(φp) (55)
If Assumption 2 is satisfied, then job creation is profitable if the effort constraint is sat-
isfied and the job creation costs are low enough. From equations (47) and (48), it follows
that
Nno-bc(φcφp0)=
φp − (1−βρ)φc
1−β
(56)
if φp ≥ φ˜pno-bc = χ and φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
48Assumption 2 ensures that the value of μ is low enough to ensure that entry is profitable as long as the
efficiency condition is satisfied and the entry costs are low enough.
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Now consider the case with business cycles. Here we focus on fragile jobs. If the job can
never satisfy the effort constraint or if the job creation costs are too high, then the job
will not be created and revenues are equal to μ. Thus,
if φp < φ˜pbc(Φ+) or φc > φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
(57)
then E
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)
]= μ
1−β
Now suppose that φp ≥ φ˜pbc(Φ+), φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+), and (since we focus on fragile
jobs) φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−). The value for
E
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)
]= (Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp)+Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp))
2
is equal to
E
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)
]= 1
2
(
φp(1+ΔΦp)+μ− (1−βρπ)φc
1−β
)
 (58)
This formula follows from equation (50) and
Nbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)
(59)
= μ+β(πNbc(φcφp01−ΔΦp)+ (1−π)Nbc(φcφp01+ΔΦp))
The formulas in the proposition follow directly from combining the formulas for the
appropriate NPVs.
For example, consider the case with φ˜pbc(Φ+) ≤ φp < φ˜pbc(Φ−) and φc ≤
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+). We get that
L(φcφpΔΦp) =
(1−β)
φp
(
Nno-bc(φcφp0)−E
[
Nbc(φcφp0Φpt)
])
= 1− (1−βρ) φc
φp
− 1
2
(
(1+ΔΦp)+ μˆ− (1−βρπ)
φc
φp
)
(60)
= 1−ΔΦp − μˆ
2
+
(
(1−βρπ)− 2(1−βρ)
2
)
φc
φp

First, consider the case when
(1−βρπ)− 2(1−βρ)
2
≥ 0 (61)
Then it follows directly from the third part of Assumption 2 that L(φcφpΔΦp) > 0. Now
consider the case when
(1−βρπ)− 2(1−βρ)
2
< 0 (62)
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Since φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)= (φp(1+ΔΦp)−μ)/(1−βρπ), we get that
L(φcφpΔΦp) ≥
1−ΔΦp − μˆ
2
+
(
(1−βρπ)− 2(1−βρ)
2
)
(1+ΔΦp − μˆ)
(1−βρπ)
= 1−ΔΦp − μˆ
2
+ (1+ΔΦp − μˆ)
2
− (1−βρ)(1+ΔΦp − μˆ)
(1−βρπ) (63)
= 1− μˆ− (1−βρ)(1+ΔΦp − μˆ)
(1−βρπ) 
If the second part of Assumption 2 is divided by χ, then it immediately follows that
L(φcφpΔΦp)≥ 0. 
Appendix C: Implementation of empirical approach: Details
C.1 Some definitions
• The mass of cyclical fragile jobs operating in a world with business cycles is
EC-fragile =
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
The associated output level evaluated at Φpt = 1 is
YC-fragile =
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
• The mass of permanent-loss fragile jobs is
EPL-fragile =
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
The associated output level evaluated at Φpt = 1 is
YPL-fragile =
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
• The mass of timed-entry jobs is
Etimed-entry =
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
The associated output level evaluated at Φpt = 1 is
Ytimed-entry =
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφ
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• The mass of jobs not affected by timed-entry or the agency problem is
E =
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ
c
(φp)
f (φcφp)dφc dφ
The associated output level evaluated at Φpt = 1 is
Y =
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ
c
(φp)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφ
• The employment level in a boom is
Eboom =EC-fragile +Etimed-entry +E
The associated output level evaluated at Φpt = 1 is
Yboom = YC-fragile +Ytimed-entry +Y
C.2 Calculating the cost of business cycles
In this section, we calculate the cost of business cycles for timed-entry jobs, cyclical
fragile jobs, and timed-entry jobs.
C.2.1 Timed-entry jobs We calculate the cost of business cycles for two choices of the
upper bound of the distribution of φc , φc(φp). The low value for φc(φp) is equal to
1
2(φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) + φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)) and the high value for the upper bound is equal to
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+) or higher. At the low value for the upper bound implied by our choice of
structural parameters, there are no timed-entry jobs and the effect of business cycles on
timed-entry jobs would, thus, be zero. In the remainder of this section, we focus on the
case when φc(φp)≥ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+).
When considering timed-entry jobs, we have to distinguish between jobs with a
value of φc above and below φ˜cno-bc(φp). First, we calculate the output associated with
the two types of timed-entry jobs:
Y
φc>φ˜cno-bc(φp)
timed-entry
Y
=
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φc>φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ(φp)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
φp
(∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φc>φ˜cno-bc(φp)
f (φc|φp)dφc
)
f (φp)dφp
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
φp
(∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ(φp)
f (φc|φp)dφc
)
f (φp)dφp
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=
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
φp
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)− φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φc(φp)−φc(φp)
)
f (φp)dφp
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
φp
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)−φc(φp)
φc(φp)−φc(φp)
)
f (φp)dφp
=
(
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)− φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)−φc(φp)
)
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
φpf (φp)dφp∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
φpf (φp)dφp
= φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)− φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)−φ(φp)

The fractions in brackets do not depend on φp since each term depends linearly on φp.
Consequently, they can be taken out of the integration.
The output measure for the other group of timed-entry jobs is given by
Y
φc<φ˜cno-bc(φp)
timed-entry
Y
= φ˜cno-bc(φp)− φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)−φ(φp)

Consider the timed-entry jobs that have a value of φc above φ˜cno-bc. The welfare
consequences are given by
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cno-bc(φp)
L(φcφpΔΦp)φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cno-bc(φp)
L(φc1ΔΦp)φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
= X
Y
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
=X
Y
φc>φ˜cno-bc(φp)
timed-entry
Y

where
X =E
[
Nbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)10Φpt)−Nbc(φ˜cno-bc(φp)10Φpt)
2
− μˆ
1−β
]

For timed-entry jobs, the problem is linear in φp. Consequently, L(·), which is defined
relative to φp, does not depend on φp, which implies L(φcφpΔΦp) = L(φc1ΔΦp)
and can be taken out of the integral. The term X measures the average cost of business
cycles for jobs with a value of φc in between φ˜cno-bc(φp) and φ˜cbc(φpΦ+). The NPV
values in the expression for X are solved from equations (33)–(36), which is a linear sys-
tem. This average cost is simply the average of the cost at the end points of the interval,
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since L(φcφpΔΦp) is linear in φc and the distribution of φc conditional on φp is uni-
form. The calculated cost is a gain, that is, X < 0, independent of the value for ωe.
The second type of timed-entry jobs are those that have a value of φc below φ˜cno-bc.
There welfare consequences are given by
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
L(φcφpΔΦp)φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
L(φc1ΔΦp)φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
= X
Y
∫ ∞
φ˜p(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cno-bc(φp)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
=X
Y
φc<φ˜cno-bc(φp)
timed-entry
Y

where
X = E
[
Nbc(φ˜cno-bc(φp)10Φpt)−Nbc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)10Φpt)
2
− Nno-bc(φ˜cno-bc(φp)10Φpt)−Nno-bc(φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)10Φpt)
2
]

This is a gain when ωe = 1, but can be a loss when ωe < 1. Entrepreneurs always benefit
from the option to delay job creation, but workers may not if job creation is not efficient.
Consequently, workers may suffer if business cycles induce these entrepreneurs to post-
pone job creation some of the time when they would never do so in a world without
business cycles.
C.2.2 Cyclical fragile jobs We first calculate the associated output measure, which is
then used to calculate the cost of business cycles. Calculating the output that cyclical
jobs produce is done in two steps. First, we calculate the mass of cyclical fragile jobs
relative to total employment in a boom. Next, we calculate the associated output level.
From the data, we obtain a measure for Ξ1, where Ξ1 is defined as
mass of cyclical fragile jobs
+ mass of timed-entry jobs exiting during downturn (64)
=Ξ1 ∗Eboom
The relevance of timed-entry jobs depends on the choice for φc(φp). If the lower value
for φc(φp) is chosen, then there are no timed-entry jobs for the calibrations considered
here and we immediately get that
EC-fragile
Eboom
=Ξ1 (65)
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Next, consider the case for which the upper bound of the distribution of φc is at (or
above) the cutoff level for timed-entry jobs in a boom. This means that all potential
timed-entry jobs are in the domain of φc . Using that the expected duration of a recession
is eight quarters, we get that
EC-fragile +XEtimed-entry =Ξ1 ∗Eboom (66)
where
X = (ρ+ (1− ρ)ρ+ · · · + (1− ρ)7ρ) (67)
We now can derive a lower bound for
EC-fragile
Eboom
= Ξ1 −
X
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
Eboom
>Ξ1 −
X
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
∫ φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
= Ξ1 −X φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)− φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp)
(68)
×
∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp∫ ∞
φ˜pbc(Φ−)
f (φcφp)dφc dφp
= Ξ1 −X φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)− φ˜cbc(φpΦ−)
φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp)

The equality is replaced by an inequality, because we replace total employment in a
boom, E(Φ+), by the sum of regular and timed-entry employment, which is smaller.49
To understand the last two steps, note that φ˜cbc(φpΦ+), φ˜cbc(φpΦ−), and φc(φp)
are linear in φp.
Now that we have calculated the mass of cyclical fragile jobs, we turn to the question
of how to calculate the output produced by cyclical fragile jobs. In our numerical work,
we take a stand on Ξ2, which is the productivity of cyclical jobs relative to the produc-
tivity of jobs not affected by the agency problems. That is,
(1+ΔΦp)YC-fragile
EC-fragile
=Ξ2
(1+ΔΦp)(Yboom −YC-fragile)
E(Φ+)−EC-fragile 
49Since the number of cyclical jobs is bounded by the total observed variation in the number of workers
over the cycle, the ratio (E+Etimed-entry)/Eboom cannot be very small so that the inequality introduces little
slack.
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From this we get
YC-fragile
Yboom
=
Ξ2
EC-fragile
Eboom
1− EC-fragile
Eboom
(1−Ξ2)

Now that we have calculated the output measure, we calculate the cost of business
cycles. The net loss for fragile jobs with φc ≤ φ˜∗cbc(φ+) is given by
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
L(φcφpΔΦp)φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
(1−ΔΦp)φp −μ+φc(1−βρπ − 2(1−βρ))
2Y
× f (φcφp)dφc dφp
+
∫ φ˜pno-bc
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
−(1+ΔΦp)φp +μ+φc(1−βρπ)
2Y
× f (φcφp)dφc dφp
≥
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
−ΔΦpφp +φcβρ(1−π)
2Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
−ΔΦp
+(φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp))βρ(1−π)
2φp
2Y
(69)
×φpf(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
−2ΔΦp + (φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp))βρ(1−π)
4φpY
×φpf(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
−2ΔΦp + (φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp))βρ(1−π)
4φp
×
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pbc(Φ+)
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
−2ΔΦp + (φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp))βρ(1−π)
4φp
YC-fragile
Y
≥
−2ΔΦp + (φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp))βρ(1−π)
4φp
YC-fragile
Yboom

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In the first row, the value of L(·) is multiplied by φp since L(·) is scaled by φp. The
expressions used for L(·) are given in Proposition 3. The first inequality is based on
the assumption that the mass of jobs below φ˜pno-bc does not exceed the mass above
φ˜pno-bc and on using the welfare loss (gain) for jobs at φp = φ˜pno-bc that are lower
(higher) than the welfare losses (gains) for other fragile jobs.50 The latter reduces little
slack in the calculations, at least for the parameter values we explored. The reason that
(φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp))/φp can be taken outside the integration is that the numerator
is linear in φp so that the ratio does not depend on φp.
C.2.3 Permanent-loss fragile jobs First, we calculate the output that could be gener-
ated by fragile jobs with a value of φc such that φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+) < φc ≤ φ˜cno-bc(φp). If a
job’s value of φc is above φ˜cbc, then it is too high to make entry profitable in a world with
business cycles. Consequently, we do not observe these jobs in the real world. These
jobs, however, have one characteristic in common with the fragile jobs we do observe
and that is their productivity level, φp. In particular, the productivity levels of these jobs
are in between φ˜pno-bc and φ˜p(Φ−), which means that they are in the upper half of the
productivity levels of the fragile jobs that produce YPL-fragile. Given our assumptions on
f (φc|φp), it is then straightforward to calculate YPL-fragile:
YPL-fragile
Y
=
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
= X
Y
∫ φ˜pbc(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φ
c
(φp)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp (70)
≥ X
2
YC-fragile
Y
≥ X
2
YC-fragile
Yboom

where
X =
φc(φp)− φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)−φc(φp)

Because X does not depend on φp, it can be taken out of the integral. The inequality
follows directly from Assumption 3, which states that the mass of fragile jobs with a value
of φp below φ˜pno-bc does not exceed the mass of fragile jobs with a value of φp above
φ˜pno-bc.
The welfare loss of fragile jobs with a value of φc above φ˜∗cbc(φpΦ+) is given by
∫ φ˜p(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
L(φcφpΔΦp)φp
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
=
∫ φ˜p(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φp −μ− (1−βρ)φc
Y
f(φcφp)dφc dφp
50See equation (30).
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=
∫ φ˜p(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φp −μ− (1−βρ)φ˜cbc(φpΦ+)+φc(φp)2
Y
× f (φcφp)dφc dφp (71)
=
∫ φ˜p(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
Xφpf(φcφp)dφc dφp
=X
∫ φ˜p(Φ−)
φ˜pno-bc
∫ φc(φp)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)
φpf (φcφp)dφc dφp
=XYPL-fragile
Y

where
X =
1− μˆ− (1−βρ)
φ˜∗
cbc(φpΦ+)+φc(φp)
2φp
Y

which does not depend on φp.
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